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My doctoral dissertation studies the effects of countercyclical bank markups
on macroeconomic performance. The countercyclical pattern of bank markups
constitutes a bank-supply channel that extends the credit channel to rein-
force the same vicious circle: Credit is more expensive during recessions, so
that firms and households postpone investment and work decisions, thereby
deepening the recmsion.
In the first chapter, I construct a bank balancesheet data set across I24
countries for 1991-2000. I show that ex-post bank markups are strongly
countercyclical, even a,fter controlling for financial development, bank con-
centration, operational costs, inflation, and reverse causation.
I
The countercyclical pattern is explained by the highly procyclical entry
of foreign banks that occurs mostly at the wholesale level, and signals the
intention to spread to the retail level. My hypothesis is that wholesale entry
triggers incumbents'limit-pricing strategies aimed at deterring entry in retail
niches that in turn reduce bank markups. In the second chapter, I develop a
DSGE setup in which the modeling of the banking system captures several
of the features of the data. I find that market power in the fina.ncial system
increases the volatility of all real variables, amplifies the business cycle, and
reduces welfare.
In the third chapter, I use a riariant of the New Keynesia,n model for a
SOE and add the bank-supply ctrannel to the standard balancesheet channel,
which links the condition of the borrower balance sheets to the default risk
and the external finance premium. I show that bank markup increments, as a
consequence of sudden capital outflows, end up increasing borrowing costs for
firms, as well as damaging the financial position of firms. The bank-supply
channel helps to explain the relatively large investment volatility typically
e>rperienced in emerging economies. These conclusions are robust to different
monetary regimes. Results hold even with floating exchange rates, slow pass-
through, a,nd liabilities fully denominated in local currency.
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The Bankittg System and the
Business Cycle: An Empirical
Analysis.
1.1 Introduction
A variety of theoretical models and ample empirical evidence support the ercistence of coun-
tercyclical markups in real goods markets.l In turn, these countercyclical markups consti-
tute an importa,nt internal propagation mechanism in business cycle models. This paper
is concerned with financial markets, for which practically no work on the cyclicality of the
ma.rkups exists.2 The questions this study addresses are:
L- Is there a countercyclical pattern in financial markups?
2- If yes, what generates this pattern?
3- What are the implications of these countercyclical markups for the real economy?
'For instance, see Pigou (1927), Keynes (1939), Phelps and Winter(1970), Greenwald et al (1984), Rotem-
berg and Saloner(L986), Murphy et al (1989), Bils (1989), Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), Gaff (1994),
Chevallier and Sharfstein (1996), Galeotti and Schiantarelli (1998) among others.
2While writing this dissertation, the existent literature on countercyclical bank markups was significantly
benefited by new contributions. Olivero (2005) develops a model where countercyclical bank ma.rkups provide
a potential solution to the "consumption-output" and "quantity" anomaly observed in the international
transmission ofbusiness cycles. Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2005) provide evidence that supports the presence
of countercyclical margins in the US banking system.
To test the first assertion, I use bank data across 124 countries for the years 199L-2000.
I use dynamic panel techniques to confront the potential bias induced by simulta^neity or re-
verse causation, and ora,rrine whether the exogenous component of GDP growth negatively
affects bank markups. Since past work shows that long-run economic growth is a good
predictor of financial development that enhances competition and thus erodes markups,
I control for a three-year average of financial development to isolate the business cycle
component.
To assess the strength of an independent link between the markups and the business
cycle, I use various conditioning variables that include a proxy for concentration, overhead
costs (operative and administrative costs), inflation volatility, and changes in real interest
rates. The results remain robust to any of these factors. The countercyclical behavior of the
markups vanishes, however, when controlling for the entry of foreign banks, which happens
to be highly procyclical.
I rely on this last result to support my hypothesis regarding the second question. In
the last decade, banks have expaaded internationally by establishing foreign subsidiaries
and branches or by taking over established banks. It is well-documented that foreign entry
initially occurs at the wholesale level, but with the final intention to spread to the retail
niches.s Therefore, we can predict that the threat of foreign banks encroactring on retail
ma,rkets may induce greater efficiency of the established ba,nks at the retail level. The
penetration into the retail sector is obstructed, however, by the need to incur large sunk
entry costs (for insta,nce, Iarge advertisement expenditures or the construction of a network
of bra,nches and ATMs required to accommodate small transactions). This implies that
3See Claessens et al (2001).
banks need to enter at a minimum-efficient-scale (MES) to justify the sunk costs incurred.
In turn, it follows that right a,fter entering they must capture a large enough fraction of
the market to make the constructed network profitable. This is particularly difficult in the
banking industry since the markets are highly segmented into regional or sectorial niches
(Rajan and Petersen, 1994). In this scenario, the size of the market constitutes a barrier
to entry. If the relevant financia,I market is small or underdeveloped there is space for only
few incumbents working at an effi.cient scale. Thus, boom periods lead to a,n expansion
of the financial system that attracts potential competitors who can operate at an efficient
scale. In this situation, contestable markets force incumbents to ctrarge markups well below
short-run profit maximizing levels to avoid entry. In contrast, during recessions, the banks
in the local financial system are able to exert their monopolistic power by charging high
markups. As shown in Bain (1956), pricing decisions strongly influence firms contemplating
entry and justify limit-pricing strategies that are counter to short nrn profit maximization.
With this idea in mind, I extend the empirical analysis to show that the competitive
pressure of entry is short-lived. The aim is to show that foreign entry a,ffects markups
by triggering pricing strategies arnong incumbents rather than by transforming an existent
monopolistic ma,rket structure. I also show that entry exerts a significant impact only in
developing economies, for whictr financial development is restricted and more concentrated
markets a^re subject to bothersome regulations that inhibit competition in normal circurn-
stances.
Regarding the third question, the cyclicality of the markups may help to explain
dence that suggests an important role for financial development in the magnitude of
evl-
the
business cycle a. If bank markups are countercyclical, then there is a ba,nk-supply channel
that extends the credit channel to reinforce the same vicious circle: Credit is more expensive
during recessions, and firms and households postpone investment and work decisions and
make the recession deeper. But while the standard version of the credit channel relies on an
external fina,nce problem that induces banks to charge a premium to cover the increasing
expected bankruptcy costs during recessions, the bank-supply channel is solely the result
of imperfect competition in the banking system. This channel may be particula"rly relevant
in developing countries, in which bank credit remains the primary source of funds for en-
trepreneurs. The second chapter of this dissertation develops a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model that is designed to highlight the macro implications of the limit pricing
scheme that constitutes the bank-supply channel. The microfoundations of the banking
system embedded in the general equilibrium setup account for several features of the data.
The first chapter is orga,nized as follows. In section 2, I discuss the methodology to
measure bank markups a^nd provide a literature review. In section 3, I present the empirical
results. The theoretical model and concluding remarks are in Chapter 2
1,.2 Markups Measurement and Literature Review
The first step in answering the three questions posed is to find a proper measure for ma,rkups
in the banking industry data. A simple approach is to consider the ex-ante (posted) spreads
or the difference between leuding and deposits rate, as a proxy for financial markups. The
aFor a Survey, see Gertler and Hubbard (1988).
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difficulty here is that the spreads include a risk premium to cover expected borrowers'
bankruptcy costs that increase during recessions and cause the spread to be countercyclical.
Thus, we expect that, in the long run, aggregate bank income obtained from such risk
premium charges match banks' loan default costs. Therefore, I use annual bank balance
sheet erc-post data that accounts for defaulted loans to proxy for net markups. In particular,
I use net interest margins (NIM), equal to bank's total interest income minus interest ex-
pense over total assets after subtracting defaulted loa,ns. Other issues remain though. Some
of the loan contracts a,re settled for even longer periods of time and at predetermined rates.
It may be the case that during recessions, riskier entrepreneurs facing liquidity constraints
are more prone to dema^nd credit. Higher margins would reflect the premium obtained for
new riskier loans that would not necessarily fall in default during the year in consideration.
However, defaults are much more likely to occur in recessions. Following this line of argu-
ment, if a pa"rticular bank liked to enter into long-term contracts at predetermined rates,
one would expect that the default frequency for all its loans would significantly increase
during recessions, driving down its net interest income and offsetting any positive effect
from the new loans. Tio sum up, evidence of increasing margins in bad times would pro-
vide support to my idea of countercyclical markups. As explained in Demirguc-Kunt and
Huizinga (1998), bank interest ma,rgins can be seen as an indicator of the pure inefficiency
of the banking system.
Practically all the existent literature is focused on ex-ante spreads. Related to this paper,
Hanna,n and Berger (1991) find that a,fter a monetary contraction ex-ante spreads tend to
increase more in regional U.S. markets in which the banking industry is more concentrated.s
tSee also Edwards and Vegh (1997) and Olivero (2004) for additional references.
In addition, Angellini and Cetorelli (2003) consider the growth of GDP as an additional
control variable in the estimation of Lerner indexes for the Italian banking industry, finding
a negative association. However, they do not settle the issues ofcausality and endogeneity.
Although the cyclicality of the markups does not receive particular attention, there is
a,n enormous literature on bank structtue and efficiency. This literature contains ambigu-
ous results. In a survey Rhoades (L977) expresses "disbelief and frustration" in the overall
inability to link concentration and efficiency. New surveys and studies reach the same con-
clusions.6 Contradictory results must be preceded by contradictory theories. The intuition
of the Structure-Conduct-Performance (S-C-P) hypothesis is straightforward: A more con-
centrated ma,rket lowers the costs of collusion and fosters tacit or explicit collusion on the
part of the banks. In contrast, the Efficient-Structure (B.S) hypothesis predicts efficiency
gains from market consolidation. Firms possessing a comparative advantage in production
become large a^nd, as a natural consequence, the market becomes more concentrated. Such
cost differences may be due to differences in technological or managerial skills. The effect is
amplified because of large economies of scale existent in the bank industry. They are derived
from risk diversification, Iower average administrative costs (Demsetz 1973), and the effi-
cient use of large surrk costs like the construction of large networks of branches and ATM's
(Cerasi et al, L997). Additionally, Gilligan et af (1984) provide evidence that banking is
characterized by economies of scope from joint production of financial services. Finally,
in the absence of restrictions on entry, excessive inefficient profi.ts are precluded (Baumol,
oMore contradictive results a,re found in Berger and Hannan (1989); Neumark and Sha.rpe (1992); Smirlock
(1985); Grady and Kyle (1979); Keeley and Zimmerman (1985). For a new survey, see Bank for International
Settlements 2001. In a worldwide analysis Demirguc-Kunt et al (2003) found, at the same time, high net
iuterest margins associated with both small banks and banks with a large ma,rket sha.re.
1982). These conclusions led to a new literature aimed at finding evidence of efficiency
gains resulting from mergers and acquisitions. The results a,re, once again, a"rrrbiguous and
inconclusive.T
Results regarding bank entry deregulation a,nd efficiency are instead mostly unambigu-
ous a^nd conclusive. Several surveys hold that new legislations that remove substantial
entry barriers and expose national banking markets to potential new entrants produce pro'
competitive effects and reduce margins. Besides, banks lose market power following financial
liberalization even in if the banking industry remains highly concentrated.8
A more interesting result about deregulation is related to the timing of the efficrency
gains. In a study of over 80 countries, Claessens et af (2001) find that foreign bank entry is
significantly associated with a reduction in domestic bank profitability. However, the impact
of foreign bank entry on local bank competition is "..felt immediately upon entry decision
is taken rather after they have gained substantial market share." Angelini and Cetorelli
(2000) find that net interest margins declined sharply immediately a,fter a banking reform
was made effective in Italy. Similarly Sha,ffer (1993) analyzes ths imFact of the Ba^nk Act
Revisions in Ca.nada and finds evidence of an "unexpected supercompetitive state" right
after entry deregulation, with negative bank markups observed. The author concludes that
suctr atypical outcome ".. is not consistent with long run equilibrium behavior under known
static or dynamic models of profit maximization; and it may simply reflect a temporary
disequilibrium...(which) may warrant further study." These last three studies resemble my
TSee for instance, Focarelli et aI (1999), Prager and Hannan, (1999); Simons and Stavins, (1998) a,nd
Petersen and Raja.n (1994).
8For a srrrvey see Vives (1991) and Demirguc-Kunt (2003). Also Spiller and Favaro (1987) focus on the
pro-competitive impact of the relaxation of entry restrictions in the Uruguayan industry, concluding that
collusive strategic interactions across ba.nks signi-ficantly decrease afber the regulatory reform. Ribon and
Yosha (1999) reach similax conclusions for the Israeli banking industry.
hypothesis of limit pricing.
To summarize, the evidence fits well with my limit-pricing hypothesis: a) Bank spreads
a,re more countercyclical in concentrated markets; b) When bank systems are ocposed to
potential competition, efficiency gains are immediately observed and occur long before any
change in the market structure is registered c) There exists an ambiguous a^nd contradicting
relationship between concentration and efficiency. That is, my hypothesis predicts that
incumbents experience periods of monopolistic markups followed by periods in which the
efficiency gains from consolidation (and exploitation of economies of scale and scope) prevail.
1.3 Evidence on Markups and Foreigrt Entry
I construct an unbalanced pa^nel from several data sources. The resulting sa,mple covers
124 countries during the yea^rs 1991-2000. Bank structure information is taken from Scope
Database provided by IBCA, which contains data for 137 countries. To ensure reasonable
coverage, only countries with at least three ba,nks in a given yeax are included. Coverage by
IBCA is comprehensive, accounting for roughly 90% of. the assets of banks in each country.
Each country has its own data template that allows for difierences in account conventions.
However, these are converted to a format which is a globally standardized template derived
from the country-specific templates. In the regressions, I control for unobserved time-
inva,riant country-specific effects to account for the minor differences in the valuation of
assets that necessarilv remain.
Measures of the activitv of financial intermediaries are taken from the Levine-Loayzu
Beck Data Set. Macroeconomic data comes from the Penn World Table 6.1 (PWT 6.1.).
Data on real interest rates is taken from the World Development Indicators 2002. Institu-
tional data is taken from both the International Country Risk Guide and Dollar and Kraay
(2001). Va,riable definitions and a few descriptive statistics are provided in the statistical
appendix. The degree of financial development captured by the ratio of Priaate Credi,t/
GDP is significantly larger in developed countries than in developing ones. On average,
margins are 571 bp for developing countries and 268 bp for developed ones. Besides, these
are much more volatile in developing economies. Poorer countries also have a relatively
high degree of concentration a,nd foreign penetration.
Econometric Methodology The aggregation of time series would obscure underly-
ing microeconomic dynamics, whereas panel data techniques allow for the investigation of
heterogeneity in adjustment dynamics between different types of countries.
The estimation procedure needs to tackle some important issues. As mentioned, I must
allow for the presence of unobserved country-specific effects that a,re correlated with the
regressors. Besides, most of the explanatory variables in the specifications to be used (e.g.
GDP growth rates, private credit, etc.) are determined jointly with the dependent variable
(i.e. net interest margins). Therefore, I must also allow and control for joint endogeneity. To
confront these issues I use a GMM in differences specification that controls for endogeneity
by using internal instruments (i.e. instruments based on lagged values of the explanatory
variables).
However, other concerns remain. I need to use a dynamic specification to allow for
the inertia in the dependent variable that is likely to be present in the annual balance-
sheet information. In addition, non-time-varying institutional covariates wiII be part of the
l
control sets. Therefore, I start from an auto-regressive dynamic model and use a relatively
efficient GMM system specification that adds equations in levels to the ones in differences.
Finally the small sample size raises a concern for overfitting bias. For robustness, I
alternate the number of lags used as instruments and restrict the quantity of explanatory
variables in the estimations. In addition, I report results of an equivalent system estimator
based in a combination of orthogonal deviations and regressions in levels. A detailed expla-
nation of the econometric methodology to be used in this study can be found in Appendix
A.
The dynamic specification consists on an autoregressive-distributed lag model:
ait 
- 
aUi,t-l + 0*n * (rh + ei) lol<1 i-L,2,...,ltr; t - 2r3r.,.rT, (1.1)
Where g4s denotes net interest margins (I.[IM) for country i in period t. ra1 is a vec-
tor of current and lagged values of additional orplanatory va.riables and is assumed to be
endogenous. ry is a,n unobserved country-specific time-invariant effect. e6t is a disturbance
term that is assumed to be serially uncorrelated and independent across individuals. For
robustness, time dummies are included to account for timespecific effects.
Net interest Margins -Time Series Properties- I first consider a very simple
AR(1) specifi.cation. The first two columns of Table 1 report OLS levels a,nd Within Group
estimates of the auto-regressive parameter a, along with heteroskedasticity-consistent esti-
mates of the asymptotic standa,rd errors. As shown in Appendix A, the OLS estimate is
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likely to be biased upwards and the within groups estimate is likely to be biased downwards
if AR(1) provides a good representation for the series. However, the differenced GMM es-
timator is found to be significa^ntly below the lower bound indicated by the within groups
estimator. These downward biases in differenced GMM estimates of the AR(l) are con-
sistent with the finite sample biases expected in the case of highly persistent series. The
preferred specification is clearly the GMM system estimator. With the introduction of the
equations in levels, I obtain a remarkable improvement in the precision of the pararneter
estimates. The results indicate a large degree of persistence in the net interest margins
(.728-.759). The inertia may arise from lagged effects of the explanatory variables, which
is to be expected in balance sheets data with annual frequency. We can also observe that
the assumption that the disturba^nces a,re serially uncorrelated cannot be rejected. As this
model is overidentified, I use the Sargan statistic to test the validity of the overidentifying
restrictions. In this case, f obtain a chi-squa,re statistic, which gives the reported p-value
of 0.1-23. The null hypothesis that these moment conditions are valid is not rejected at any
conventional level. consistent with the first and second order serial correlations tests for
fi rst-differenced residuals.
Basic Model A simple approadr, and a first step, in studying the pattern of the mar-
gins throughout the business cycle is to include GDP growth in the AR(1) model. Prior
to presenting the results, I would like to clarify the interpretation. To the extent that the
assumptions regarding the instruments employed are correct, the econometric methodology
is designed to isolate the effect of the exogenous component of the explanatory variable on
the interest margins. Herea"fter, when I mention the impact or efiect of a given va,riable on
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the ma,rgins, I am referring to this isolated exogenous component and not merely describing
the association between them. In Table 2, GROWTH has a highly significant a.nd negative
effect on the margins despite their persistence. According to the preferred system specifi-
cation, an increase in income of I0% causes the margins to fall by approximately 1% (100
bp) on impact.
The literature presents extensive evidence of a strong link between long-run economic
growth and financial development. It may be that financial development that enhances
competition explains the negative relationship mentioned above. In order to assess and
control for fina,ncial development, I include a threeyear-overlapping average of private.credit
offered by commercial banks (PRIV.CRED (*il in the conditional set.e Notice that by
computing averages of this dependent variable we a,re artificially constructing a persistent
series that shouid not be affected by short-run fluctuations. Finite sa,mple bias is therefore
expected in the differenced specifi.cation. In contrast, the preferred system specification
shows this variable to have a significant and sizeable negative effect on the margins.lo
GROWTH remains significantly at a LITo level though with a slightly lower coefficient.
This result supports the hypothesis of fluctuating margins at a business cycle frequency.
Moreover, the statistical significance of these results wiII improve when controlling for other
relevant covariates.
Sensitivity analysis I use various conditioning information sets to assess the strength
of the countercyclical nature of the margins depicted in the basic model. I start by introduc-
9 Thrce-y"or-ouerlapping averages are calculated asi ai.t(oas) 
- 
a&+ui't=r+ai't-2 
.
10The coefficient can be interpreted as follows: If. tbe Pri,a.Credit/GDP ratio increases by 50%, margins
fall by approximately 150 basis points on impact.
L2
ing a proxy for concentration as a control variable, the assets ofthe three largest banks as a
share of the assets of all the commercial banks in the system. The variable is significant and
again enters with a negative sign. Refer to table 2. These results support the implications of
the E-S hypothesis which predicts operational efficiency gains from banking consolidation.
The large number of expla,natory variables accompanied by a relative large pvalue for the
Sargan test estimates raises a concern about overfitting bias. However, no clear pattern in
the coefficient estimates is observed when reducing or increasing the mrmber of instruments.
I also report results for an equivalent system estimator based in a combination of orthogonal
deviations and level equations. No significa,nt ctranges are registered, results appear to be
robust regardless the estimation method used.
If the negative effect of concentration on margins is explained by efficiency gains, I would
expect this impact to vanish when controlling for operating costs. Therefore, I expand the
conditioning set and include overhead costs (OVERCOSTS). They are defined as personnel
expenses (mostly wages) and other non interest expenses divided by the total bank assets
in the local banl< system. Refer to Table 3.
As expected, large operating costs cause margins to increase. The variable enters sig-
nificatively and with a sizeable positive coefficient. In support to the FS hypothesis, the
inclusion of this variable causes the concentration coefficient to become insignificant and
small in sign. Although the size of PRIV.CRED (aug) is marginally reduced, the cyclical
component (i.e. GROWTH) remains mostly una,ffected and significant at a 5% Ievel.
Saunders and Shumacher (2000) show that interest rate volatility, usually observed in
a context of high and variable inflation, is positively related to margins. Thus, I proceed
by adding inflation and real interest rates to the conditioning set. None of these variables
13
turns out to be significant. See Table 3 again.ll
The Role of Foreign Entry Up to this point, I have shown that the exogenous
cyclical component of economic growth is negatively associated with net interest margins.
Moreover, this link is not due to potential biases induced by omitted variables (including
that derived from unobserved country specific effects), simultaneity, or reverse causation.
In the next step, I test the main hypothesis proposed in the paper. That is, countercyclical
markups are the result of a limit pricing strategy aimed at deterring highly procyclical entry
of competitors in a segmented local financial system. As I explained in the introduction,
although the threat of entry is a non-measurable concept, foreign penetration can be con-
sidered a good proxy for it. Consequently I would expect the negative association between
margins and economic growth to vanish when controlling for foreign entry.
Thus, I introduce foreign entry in the conditioning set. Refer to Table 4. The covariate
Forei,gnBanlcs refers to the number of foreign banks divided by the total number of banks
in a given country. Foreign bank entry is measured as a change in foreign bank presence
(i.e. A,ForeignBanks6l). The first experiment, not reported here, consisted in introducing
A,Forei,gnBanksil into the qrtended model presented in the last subsection. Its influence
turns out to be negligible and statistically insignificant. The results are different when I
consider LForei,gnBanksi,l-1. Therefore, if limit pricing exists, it occurs one year a,frber
the entry decision is effectively taken. This lagged variable not only exerts a significa.nt
rllt is puzzling to observe that the coefficients for GROWTH and PRIV.CRED (aug) actually increase
when these covariates are included to the conditioning set. It may be the result of money-based disinflation
programs being accompanied by short-lived recessions. These events would imply, at the same time, higher
margins due to the recession but lower ma.rgins and credit availability resulting from stable and low inflation.
Thus, if we do not control for inflation, we would expect margins to be less countercyclical and less sensible
to variables linked with growth indicators.
L4
negative effect on the margins, but also breaks down the independent impact of. GROWTH
by turning it small and insignifica^nt. It may be the case that the beginning of wholesale
operations occurs some time after the official entry registration occurs. These results may
also provide support for the supposition that entry occurs at a wholesale level and then
spreads to retail niches with a time lag.
To assess the strength of this Iast finding, I would like to eliminate the possibility that
the lower margins are a consequence of pro-efficiency gains from a larger presence of foreign
banks in the local financial structure.
Notice that the proposed model here is:
A it : aA i,t 
- 
t * p r 6t * 1 A^F or e'i g n B ank s,i,,t 
-t * (rl t+, m) i - L12, ..., .A/1 t - 2,3, ...,7. (L.2)
where yal is the dependent variable, 161 an! of the controlling sets already introduced,
and A, F or ei gn B ank s,;,1 
-t : F or e'i g n B ank s,i,1 -1 - F or ei g n B anle s 4,1 -2.
Alternatively (1.2) ca,n be expressed as:
yit : ayi,t-7]- gx* l TlForei,gnBanksi,l*1 * T2ForeignBanks,i,l-2 * (rn * e,it). (1.3)
Where ^yL: 
-iz.
15
l-
I
I
I
I
Thus, if the results are driven by entry we expect the coeffi.cients, 1,1 and ?2, preceding
Fore'i'gnBanles4,1-1 and ForeignBanksi,6-2 to be significant and of the same magnitude,
but with opposite signs (i.e. the first one negative and the second one positive). In conrrasr,
if the results a,re driven by the presence of foreign ba,nks, ./21 must either be negative or
at least small. In other words, the long-run or steady state effect (lt+l)11- a should
significantly differ from zero.
Once again, the results do not reject my hypothesis. The coefficients are opposite in sign
and do not significa^ntly differ in absolute value. Thus, the pro-competitive effect of entry
in the local banking system is short-lived and vanishes afrter one year.
Regional Analysis To assess the robustness of the results shown in the previous
subsections, I test whether the cyclical pattern of the margins a,nd the effect of entry differ
across different groups of countries. I distinguish between developing countries and devel-
oped ones. This simplification is intended to restrict the mrmber of covariates, reduce the
number of instruments, and avoid any risk of overfi.tting bias. I adopt the convention of
the Wbrld Development Indicators 2002, which divides all the displayed countries in four
difierent income groups. I regard the first quarter as developed countries and all the other
groups as developing countries. I add the dummy variable POOR to the equation, with
POOR equal to one if the country belongs to the latter group and zero otherwise. In what
follows, the estimated model will be:
Uit:6tltn* POORI + \zltrt * (1 - POOB)] + (rU+ €it). (L-4)
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where 261 is the vectot including the lag dependent variable plus any conditioning set
of current or lagged covariates, and 61 and 62 are the estimated parameters for developing
and developed countries respectively.l2
I present the results for the basic model at a regional level in Table 5. I control for finan-
cial development and, subsequently I add concentration as previously done in the extended
model. For robustness, f aho report the model with orthogonal deviations. The nega-
tive effect of. GROWTH in ma^rgins is relatively Iarger and more significant for developing
countries.lS
The next step is to consider the effect of entry. Since the estimates of the extended model
do not significantly differ, I group them again (so as to reduce the number of explanatory
variables and gain efficiency), and look for each groups reaction to foreign bank penetration.
The results are in Table 6. Again the introduction of foreign entry breaks down the effect
of growth. Nonetheless, entry significantly lowers margins only in developing countries.
Proefficiency gains from entry are not observed in developed countries. For this group
of countries, the coefficient associated with entry is positive and low, and only marginally
significant. In other words, if my hypothesis is valid, it only applies to entry in developing
countries.
These results a,re in accorda,nce with the predictions of Claessens et af (2001). They
argue that banking markets in developed countries tend to be competitive with sophisticated
participants. If there is any technical advantage foreign banks possess at the time of entry,
l2Rea,rranging terms, we can interpret (1.4) as follows. For a developing country, POOR: 1 and g;r :
6tztt * (q, + 
"t ); for a developed or.e POOR: 0; so thati ait : 6zza * (nt I e;t).
13The Two-step estimates of GROWTH for developed countries appeax to be biased. Since this group of
countries is small, the usual asymptotic distribution approximation seems not to be reliable in this case.
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they are not significant enough to overcome the information disadvantages they face relative
to domestic banks. In developing countries, pervasive market inefficiencies and outmoded
banking practices allow international banks to overcome such information disadvantages.
Their implicit threat of competition is significarrtly larger.
One last question remains to be addressed in the empirical analysis. AII the conclusions
I outlined rely on the assumption that entry of foreign banks occurs in booming periods.
Since the effect of entry is sizeable only in developing countries, I restrict the sample to
include only them. The results are in Table 7.
In the first three columns we ca,n observe that the state of the economy significantly
a,ffects the entry decision, even a,fter controlling for institutional variables. Entry is highly
procyclical and GROW?I/ remains significa^nt at the 5 % Ievel. Again, we rule out this result
being drive by simulta^neity or reversed causation. Under the assumption that institutional
variables do not significantly vary in a the short time span considered in this panel, we
can include non-time va,rying cova,riates in the regressions. For robustness, I also include
financial development, market concentration and the level of GDP in the conditional setting.
The last control variable is meant to capture the size of the local financial sector. Again,
I do not have evidence to reject the hypothesis that only the current state of the economy,
and not institutional factors, triggers entry decision. It seems that the size of the economy
plays a role, however. My enplanation is that the larger the economy, the larger the size of
the fina,ncial market and, thus, the more room available for additional competitors.
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Appendix A: Econometric Methodolory.
The first dynamic specification consists of a simple AR(1) model:
Ait:aUi,t-_L*(rh1tn) lol<1 i-I,2,...,.A/; t-2,3,...,7. (1.5)
Since I treat the individual effects, {41 as being stochastic, they are necessarily corelated
with the lagged dependent va,riable, yi,t-r.I further assume that the disturbances are serially
uncorrelated. These jointly imply that the OLS estimator of o is inconsistent.
The within groups estimator eliminates this source of inconsistency by obtaining mean
values across the 7 
- 
L observations in order to remove 4a. Nonetheless, for panels (like this
one) in which the number of time periods available is small, this transformation induces
a non-negligible negative correlation between the tra^nsformed lagged dependent variable
Aii-! 
- #(Aot + .. + An * ... I ALr-t) and the transformed error term eii-L - fr1@,i2 +
.. * ea,t-r + ... + e6,7). Standard results for omitted variable bias indicate that the OLS
estimator is biased upwa"rds and the within groups one is biased downwards. Therefore, a
consistent candidate estimator must lie between the OLS and within groups estimates.
The first-difference transformation of (1.5) also eliminates 4a from the model, but the
dependence of Ae61 
- 
eit 
- 
6i,r-1 on e;,1*1 implies that the OLS estimates are inconsis-
tent. Nonetheless, consistent estimates of o can be obtained using two step least squa,re
estimations (2SLS) with instruments that are both correlated with Ag;,r-1 a,nd orthogo.
nal to Aeas. The GMM estimator is asymptotically efficient since the set of all available
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instruments is used.la Specifically,
followitrg moment conditions:
the GMM difference specification is obtained from the
E lyn,t-"Aert] - 0 for s > 2; t :3, .. .,7. (1.6)
Under the homoskedasticity assumption of the disturbances, Ae6,we can construct a
one-step estimator based on a weighting matrix that does not depend on any estimated
parameters. Otherwise we can proceed in twesteps and use consistent estimates of the first
differenced residuals previously obtained from a preliminary consistent estimator. I report
results for both since there is no a clear preference between these two estimators in the
applied work literature. 15
If. T > 3 the model is overidentified, and the validity of the assumptions used in the
estimation can be tested using the sta^ndard GMM Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions
(under the null that these moment conditions are valid). The key identifying assumption
that there is no serial correlation in the elt disturbances cail also be tested. Ifthe pattern of
serial correlation in the first-difierenced disturbances is consistent with this assumptionl Ae;g
should have significative negative first-order serial correlation but not significant second-
laMaximum likelihood estimators for the AR(l) exist, but with the awkward cha,racteristic that different
assumptions about the nature of the initial conditions, A1, lead to difierent likelihood functions that result
in inconsistent estimators for o if the initial condition is mispecified. The shorter is the time length of the
panel, the more serioug is the problem.
15In the two-step estimator, the dependence of the weighting matrix on estimated pa.rameters makes the
usual asymptotic distribution approximation less reliable for small samples. See Blundell, Bond and Wind-
meijer(2000). Therefore, I follow Windmeijer (2000) and use a finite sample correction for the asymptotic
variance of the resulting GMM estimators.
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order serial correlation.
The difference GMM estimators for autoregressive models outlined above can be ex-
tended to models that include a vector of current and lagged values of additional explana-
tory variablesj ril. Since r;1 is assumed to be endogenous, it is treated symmetrically with
the dependent variable Utt. In this case, the lagged values fii1-2ttl,r-a a,nd longer lags are
valid instruments in the first-difierenced equations for periods f : 3,4,...,?. The proposed
panel estimator controls for endogeneity by using internal instruments (i.e. instruments
based on lagged values of the explanatory variables.) Specifically, aII the explanatory vari-
ables are assumed to be weakly exogenous. This means that the explanatory variables are
uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term and thus are not affected by future
realizations of the dependent variable. The explanatory variables, however may be affected
by current and past realizations of the dependent variable. This assumption permits for the
possibility of simultaneity a,nd reverse causality.
There a,re, however, several serious econometric shortcomings with the difference es-
timator in the presence of inertia in the dependent variable. In particular, if the lagged
dependent variable is persistent over time (i.e. near unit root), lagged levels of the variables
are weak instruments for the regressions in differences.lo To improve upon and solve this
concern, Blundell and Bond (1997) propose an alternative system estimator, that combines
the regression in differences with the regression in levels. The instruments and moment
conditions for the regression in differences are the s€ilne as above.
l6other serious problems exist, First differences of the explanatory variables a.re often less correlated over
time than levels. As noted by Barro (1997), this may produce biased estimates if the dyna.rnic structure
of the differenced equation model difiers from the true model. Simulation studies show that the difference
estimator has a la,rge finite-sa.mple bias and poor precision, pa.rticularly in samples with a small time series-
dimension. Finally, by first differencing we end up losing the cross-country dimension and exploit only the
time series dimension within countries.
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For the second part ofthe system (the regression in levels) the instruments are given by
the lagged differences of the corresponding variables. These instruments are valid when the
stationarity assumption is suitable.lT In this scenario, the resultant non-redundant linear
moment conditions for the second part of the system are:
E l\yi,t-t(qt + udl 
- 
0
E lA^rt,t(h + en)l
i 
- 
L,2,...,1/;
i 
- 
Lr 2r... 
, 
.Ay';
t 
- 
3,4, ...,7.
t 
- 
2r3r,..rT.
(1.7)
It is possible to include non-time va,rying predetermined covariates in the mentioned set
of explanatory variables. Institutional indicators can be assumed to be time invariant in the
short time period considered in this study. There are T 
- 
1 non-redunda,nt moment condi-
tions that allow for the computation of estimates despite the implausibility of considering
equation in differences. These can be written as:
E l*n(r7i * €i)l - 0 i - L,2, ..., ly'; t - 2,,3,...,7. (1.8)
The use of the firll instrument set described in either the svstem or the difference esti-
mator results in the number of moment conditions tested growing rapidly as 7 increases. It
lTundet this assumption there might be a correlation between 4; and the levels of the va.riables, but this
correlation is constant over time. That is, EIA*+p,qel: Elyi,t+e.rlal and Eln;,r+n.I): Elnt,t+q.rl;.]
for all p and q. The validity of the sationa.rity assumptions about the initial conditions ga requires
, {V^- (*)l ",,} : o.
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has been shown that the size properties of the Sargan test are less sensitive to the number
of moment conditions becoming large for a given cross-sectional sample size N (Bowsher,
2000). Although, this does not necessarily imply that the GMM estimator is biased or
that the standard errors are unreliable, I have to test whether the use of a la,rge number of
instruments make the estimator itself subject to a serious overfitting bias. The usual way
to proceed is either to restrict the set of expla,natory variables, or, if necessary, to consider
only the three closest lags to the regression period (for each variable) as instruments.l8 Fi-
nally, if the results of an equivalent system estimator based in a combination of orthogonal
deviations and level equations significantly differs from the sta^ndard system, it may indicate
that small biases are important. 19 20
18The loss of relevant information caused by omitting the more distant lags as instruments is often modest
(Bond, 2002). For robustness, I also proceed by adding a,nd substracting instruments in sequential stages,
and find no relevant difierences.
leAn orthogonal deviation ri1 is the deviation of an observation from the average of future observations
in the sa,mple and is given by: e,lr:lro, 
- 
(rrr+tI .... * al6.) lQ -t)lg -t)t lg -t+De If the original
errors are IID, so are the errors using orthogonal deviations.
20For robustmess, I calculated this altenative system for all the regressions. However, since the results do
not significantly differ I chose not always to report them. The unreported results a,re available by request.
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Chapter 2
Business Cycles: A Role for
Imperfect Competition in the
Banking System.
2.L Introduction
In this chapter I present a simple general equilibrium model designed to highlight the role
of the proposed bank-supply channel in the economy. I sta,rt from a standard DSGE Real
Business Cycle model with variable labor supply in the spirit of Hansen (1985). Then, I
introduce imperfect competition with limit pricing in the financial system. This modification
creates a disintermediation between borrowers a,nd entrepreneurs that amplifies the response
of the real variables to technology shocks.
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2.2 Households
The household sector is conventional. There is a continuum of households of unit mass.
Each household works, consumes, and invests its savings in regular deposits.
The representative household ma>cimizes:
nri B'| , l-si- - - 2- vr+t.]. e.r)"A' Ll-.y " I-t^tn' I
Subject to the budget constraint:
Ct * Dt+t 
- 
WtI{t+ (1 + rt)Dt* flt. (2.2)
Where Cs is consumption; N; is labor supply; l[ denotes the real wagel D; a^re deposits
(in real terms) held at commercial banks and (1 + rr) is the gross real interest rate paid
to depositors. II1 are real dividends payments received from ownership of these financial
intermediaries.
2.2.L Optimality Conditions
Household behavior obeys:
rption and saving intertemporal allocation:
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1- gE,{ (*)'
where Y is aggregate output, Kt-t is the aggregate amount
entrepreneurs in period t 
- 
1, lfr is the labor input, and A1 is
shock.
Thus labor demand satisfies:
'l
(1 + rt+t) |) (2-3)
(2.5)
(2.6)
labor allocation:
WtCt ^t 
- 
anl'(^ (2.4)
2.3 The Entrepreneurial Sector
Entrepreneurs construct capital in each period for use in the subsequent period. Capital is
used in combination with labor to produce output. Entrepreneurs are risk neutral. Assuming
CRS, Cobb-Douglas technology, the aggregate production function is:
Yt 
- 
AtKtq tr/-o,
of capital constructed by
an exogenous technology
(1 
- ")#-wt.
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Demand for New Capital The construction of new capital is
of investment It Thus, the capital stock obeys:
Kt: It* (1 
- 
6)Kr-t,
determined by the level
where 6 is the depreciation rate.
The gross return to holding one additional unit of capital from t to t* 1, can be written
(2.7)
(2.8)
(2.e)
Supply for New Capital In equilibrium, the allocation for capital satisfies the following
optimality condition:
(1 + ,f+t) 
- 
(1 + Et+r) (1 * rt+t),
where the real interest rate, (1 * rt+r), is the gross cost of firnds absent imperfect
competition in the financial system and (1+ Et+r) is the gross markup charged by the
intermediary bank. I assume that new equity a,nd bond issues are prohibitively expensive,
or not available for local fi.rms, so that all investment finance is done with bank credit. I
will ignore the presence of the bank multiplier and the oristence of reserves. Therefore,
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the overall amount of credit in the economy must be equal to the overall amount of new
household deposits:
2.4 The Resource Constraint
The resource constraint for the economy is:
Dt+r 
- 
It.
Y-C1 *11.
(2.10)
(2.r1)
2.5 The Banking System
I assume that the banking system is highly segmented into a large number, n, of sectors or
regions (niches).
The size of each niche is the same, and eactr of them is served by an established bank
(incumbent), i, that possesses a Iocal monopoly and therefore finances a,n equal fraction f
of the total investment. Each incumbent can serve only its own niche because of an implicit
collusion agreement that is described later.
This intermediary chooses a net markup for its niche, E141, at the beginning of period
f. I assume that the cost of serving the nictre for each bank i is:
( h\'-"U,; 
\;/
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(2.r2)
The consta.nt u; is the cost-efficiency level, and captures any idiosyncratic operational
(in)efficiency a,rrd information (dis)advantages any bank may have. I assume that u4 is
drawn from a common uniform distribution U(u) with support on [0,.\] , at the beginning
of the banl< operations. u6 is private information and is unknown to banks outside the niche.
The cost of serving the niche for eactr bank i depends on the amount of credit financed
(the size of the ma,rket). In addition, the banking system possesses operational economies
of scope and scale over operating costs. Thus, I assume that 0 ( r < 1..
In period f * 1 the bank obtains the following ex-post real profits for carrying the bank
contract at period t:
nri,t+L 
- 
(1 + Et+rXt + rt+t)
'lTi,t+t: 5t+1
Entry and mergers I assume that entry is
that it occurs in successive stages. Bntrants in the
possible in this banking system, but
"banking system" at time I only start
(*) '-"]/Dr+r \ ,\ 
" 
/ tu'i'
(2.13)
(2.r4)
The first term are eutrepreneur payments and the term in brackets captures the cost of
funds (i.e. payments to depositors) plus operating costs. Using the fact that, D111 : 11,
and that Et+trt+t 
= 
0 for the parameter values I consider hete, we can express (3.33) as:
(*) -ui(*) '-"
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Figure 2-L: Entry Stages
D, ls
relleo,led
'\l[/holeso le compef if ion "
competing in the "niche' at time t * 1, which introduces a one'period time-to-build lag
in the model. Right after the entry decision is effectively taken (i.e. when the sunk costs
are incurred), the entrant is already inside the banking system, but only at the "wholesale
level." Hence, during period t it is able to temporarily serve any of the n, niches until it is
finally established in one of them in t * 1. The aim is to capture the idea of entry taking
place in the wholesale market first with the ultimate goal of spreading later to the retail
segment (niches).I
The entry stages a,re as follows:
(A) At the beginning of period t, a potential competitor, j, attempts to enter the banking
system. At no cost, it draws its cost-efficiency level, ui, from the same common uniform
lln addition, we could say that entrants need to incur in a one.period lea,rning process to make their
idiosyncratic cost-eficiency level at the regional level effective.
"""""""1
the entront i
chooss o iporticulor i
'niclle,' i
Bertrqnd
Competifion
-rtuj>ui
foilure,
-rtu j <ui
successfultoke over,
Enlry in the
'nicfe'. Q is
rewoled,
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distribution U(u).
(B) After learning its own ui, t}re potential competitor chooses whether to enter the
ba,nking system and fight for one of the nidres next period or withdraw from the ba^nking
system. The closer or' is to zero, the more efficient the potential entrant is, and the easier
to take over a niche. I will assume that the number of total draws is large enough that at
least some potential competitors enter the ba"nking system every period.
(C) To enter the banking system (and eventually fight for one ofthe niches) an outsider
has to incur fixed sunk entry costs, zs, at the beginning of period t.2 z1 is exogenous and
measured in real output units. We can also interpret changes in z1 as ctranges in entry
regulations.
(D) In principle, during period f, entrants a,re able to serve any (or even all) of the n
niches at the wholesale level until finally established in one of them. The cost of serving
other nidres at the wholesale level is:
(2.15)
where \ ) u6 for every i; given the common uniform distribution U(u) with support
on [0, )]. As in Petersen and Rajan (1994), f assume that retail banks that are physically
closer to their customers have lower costs of transacting with both firms and depositors.
2 As I said, we can include in them advertisement costs or the construction of a network of branches and
ATMs.
^ 
(&)'-' 
,\n/
39
(E) For simplicity, I assume that any entrant is able to enter only one niche (i.e. multi-
sectorial entry is not possible). The collusion agreement implies that the potential com-
petitor knows the cost-efficiency level distribution of the banking system, U(u), but cannot
infer the particular utns of. each incumbent. Hence, entrants are indifierent about the partic-
ular niche to fight for. I assume that once inside the banking system they randomly choose
which nictre to enter at the end of period t.
(F) At the very beginning of period t 17 , the entrant is inside the niche an is able to
Iearn the incumbent's u6. Bertrand competition occurs and the following proposition holds:
PROPOSITION L Und,er Bertrand competition, only two possible outumes are pos-
si,ble. If uj ) ui, the entrant faib and, is forced to merge. If ui < ua the entrant successfully
d,isplaces the incumbent and, forces it to merge. The opti,mal strategy for the loseris to merge
i,mmedi,ately and not to mmpete. The only ui,sible outcome is the possi,ble change of the i,n-
cumbent at the aery begi,nni,ng of t + 1..3
Proof. See Appendix A.
(G) If successfirl the new incumbent keeps the nictre until it is hit by an exit-inducing
shock that occurs with probability 6sr e (0,1) in every period. For simplicity, I do not
model endogenous exit that is not driven by the afore mentioned Bertrand competition.
The "death" shock is independent of the bank's efficiency level. I assume that a,n entrarrt
immediately fills the empty niche left by every dead bank. Right a,fter drawing an efficiency
level, the entrant is able to use the network left by the dead bank (avoiding any sunk costs
tBy definition the point likelihood of uj : ua is null.
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a.s well as the time-to-build lag). The number of banks and the frequency of "death" is high
enough so that E(u6) :4, *d I/(u) nests the cost-efficiency distribution of all incumbents
in the financial system.
Implicit Collusion Agreement and Limit Pricing I a.ssume that entrants are
liquidity constrained and cannot make losses after incurring sunk costs. In these circum-
stances, the pricing strategy, E141, must ensure that none of the new competitors at the
wholesale level can obtain any expected positive profits if they decide to offer a net markup
below E1a1 and serve the niche.a That is:
5t+t (2.16)
Notice, however, that low cost-efficiency incumbents have the incentive to "signal" their
idiosyncratic efficiency to new entrants by offering a markup below the level that makes
(2.16) hold as an equality (hereafter, the binding limit). From (2.14), entrants in the
banking system know that only more effi.cient incumbents can offer a markup, E1a1, well
below ) (f,)-"and still make profits. Therefore, these incumbents have incentives to offer
markups levels somewhat below the binding limit in (2.16) to influence and redirect entrants'
decisions toward less-efficient niches. The higher is the amount of entry in the ba,nking
system, the higher the incentives to protect the niche by lowering current markups and
profits. In this scena,rio, incumbents "compete" to deter entry in their own nidres. Instead,
aBy assumption, the customers remain loyal to the local incumbent bank if the level of the markup offered
is the same.
(*) <, (*) '-"
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I assume that there exists an implicit collusion agreement among the incumbents that
enforces the secrecy of the idiosyncratic cost-efficiency levels.
I assume that the implicit collusion agreement must necessarily satisfy all the incumbents
to be possible. Consequently, a cartel ma,rkup below the binding level in (2.16) does not
work. The uniform distribution with support on [0,,\], and the a.ssumption that n is very
large, implies that such cartel markup level can result in losses for members with cost-
efEciency levels in the neighborhood of ). The negative profits force defections from the
agreementl defections that actually reveal the high cost-efficiency level of those defectors.5
Therefore, the arrangement must consist of markup equal to the binding level in (2.16):
5t+t (2.17)
If some of the banks attempt to cha,rge a markup below the binding limit, one of the
members of the cartel immediately serves such nidre at the wholesale level. The punishment
consists of establishing a price just below the one chosen by the d.efector, Ei{t- e (such
that e is negligible in size). The resulting negative profits for serving the niche under this
condition are equally distributed arnong the members of the cartel. That is,
(*) -\(0") '-"
(=lfr- u) erld - x(r,ld'-" 
< on-L (2.18)
I assume that, in principle, such punishment would take place only if there is a single
5I assume that a siugle defector can transform the tacit agreement into a an explicit one. As in Rotemberg
and Woodford (1992), I assume that such scenario carries incommensurable legal sanctions for the members
of the caxtel.
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monopolistic bank serving the niche (so that Proposition t holds). In other words, the
cartel allows Bertrand competition to occur inside the niche to guarantee a monopolistic
structure in which the number of banks in the banking system never exceeds n (one bank
per niche). Finally, I assume that the amount of entry and the exogenous exit inducing
shock (positively associated with the discount factor) is high enough so that incumbents
are better off when committing to the collusive level in (2.17).
Therefore, the pricing decision is the same in all niches. Since all the niches are of the
same size, we can interpret this relationship as the pricing decision taken by the represen-
tative bank of this economy. Hence, for every period t, expected profits for eactr incumbent
'i ate:
Tf i,t+L 
- 
(,\ 
- 
,r,) >0.(*) '-" (2. re)
Equations (2.17) and (2.19) can be interpreted as follows: The greater the aggregate
investment, the bigger the size of all niches, a,nd the higher the competitive pressure of the
new entrants. In turn, this forces the incumbent to offer lower markups. These counter-
cyclical markups constitute the bank-supply channel that propagates and amplifies shocks
to the economy.
Entry decision Banks are forward looking and correctly a^nticipate their expected
stream of profits. After drawing a uj, a potential entrant decides to enter the banking
system only ifthe expected post-entry present discounted net value ofthe expected stream
of profits furi,t\|t is positive:
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Vj,t: tr,"*, 
)
(oo
{a-tpG _6n)r"-'(?)-' (r - 7) - zs > 0. (2.20)
Ba^nks discount future profits using the household's stochastic discount factor, adjusted
for the probability of survival. The pre-entry probability of "defeating" the incumbent and
taking-over the niche is L 
- 7 :Pr(ri < E(")).Equations (2.20) and (2.19) imply that
entry is procyclical (i.e. entry increases when the arnount ofcredit, purchase ofnew capital
a"nd the economic activity a,re high). The larger the discount factor and the probability of
the exit-inducing shock, the stronger the procyclicality.
Entry is affected by market regulation that alters the value of. 21.6 Equation (2.20)
implies that the higher is 21, the lower the resulting entry threshold value of u7, and thus
the lower the amount of entry in the banking system (and vice versa). But then, the higher
is 21, the more likely entries are successful when fighting for the niche. These results are in
line with the empirical evidence that entry exerts a sizable impact in small, underdeveloped,
and regulated markets.
The government can effectively prohibit entry in the banking system by setting zt ---+ @.
In this case, countercyclical limit pricing is not necessary, and incumbents are able to
establish a standard collusive agreement.
6As in Ghironi and Melitz (2005), changes in sunk entry costs alter the free'entry condition.
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2.6 Model Parametrization
The only distinctive aspect of the general equilibrium model relative to a benchmark RBC
setup is the limit pricing scheme in the financial system, characterized by equations (2.9)
and (2.17). The former characterizes how imperfect competition in the financial system
influences capital demand. The latter describes the limit pricing strategy chosen by the
representative incumbent bank. If we restrict the net fina,ncial markup E141 to zero in
equation (2.9), we effectively shut off the bank-supply dra^nnel and the model reverts to a
conventional RBC model.
I set the quarterly discount factor B to 0.99 (which also pins down the steady state
quarterly real interest rate depositors receive since 
-R : 0-t). Average hours worked relative
to total hours available are set equal to {. I set the elasticity of intertemporal-substitution, },
equal to one, and ,y' equal to zero. Following Hansen (1985), I set the standard deviation
of the productivity innovations to 0.712. The capital share, a, is 0.36. The qua,rterly
depreciation, 6, is assigned the value of0.025. Flom the descriptive statistics for developing
countries, I set the quarterly steady-state net financial ma.rkup equal to 142 basis points
arrd choose r :0.70.
2.7 A N"gative Technology Shock
I consider a,n unanticipated one percent decrease in technology to stress the role of the
bank-supply channel deepening a recession. I assume further that the shock obeys a first
order auto-correlation process that persists at the rate of 0.95 per quarter. In Figure 2,
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I plot the response of the eight endogenous variables under both perfect and imperfect
competition in the financial system. As I said, the former exactly resembles the basic RBC
specification. In this case, there a,re no financial markups and the natural or wicksellian
interest rate depositors and entrepreneurs face are the same.
In the competitive model, a negative technology shock reduces output, factor produc-
tivitS and consumption today by more than in future periods. Output and consumption
fall today and return later to their original levels. Households want to smooth their con-
sumption and attempt to shift resources away from future periods to the current period.
For this reason, we would expect the natural real interest rate to increase.
Investment demand goes down because the technology shock has decreased production.
By itself, this pushes down the natural interest rate, offsetting the pressure that comes from
households' desire to substitute consumption away from future periods. The net effect of
these counteracting pressnres is to slightly decrease the natural interest rate by just 7 basis
points.
The results change with imperfect competition. The monopolistic intermediary has the
possibility of providing credit after charging a markup over the interest rate paid to deposi-
tors. The intermediary banks allow households to substitute consumption away from other
periods toward this period by substantially decreasing the interest rate paid on deposits.
As a result, consumption does not initially faII as much as in the competitive model. But
this relatively higher consumption lowers the marginal utility of income a,nd reduces work
effort even more.
A decrease in the labor input negatively affects production and the productivity of cap
ital. This is the cause for a,n even lower demand for investment relative to the baseline case.
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Under perfect competition, a resulting lower investment demand and lower interest rates
paid to depositors would be reflected in a sharp decrease in the interest rate entrepreneurs
face. The fact that investment falls and the financial market shrinks causes the threat of
entry to decline, a.nd higher markups are compatible with the limit pricing scheme. The
financial markup increases 9.42% (13 bp) on impact. The higher markup does not allow
the costs of borrowing for entreprereurs to fall much, and thus, the optimal capital stock
is smaller than in the competitive case and the volatility of all real variables is higher.
2.8 Volatility and Welfare
Macroeconomic Variability and Sensitivity Analysis Quantitative results pre-
sented in Tables 1 and 2 confirm that the presence of monopoly power and countercyclical
markups in the banking sector ends up increasing the volatility of all real variables relative
to the simple RBC model. In the RBC model, the standard deviation of output, con-
sumption and investment is 1.80, 0.52 and 5.74 respectively. With a monopolistic banking
system, the corresponding values for the sa,me variables are 2.3L,0.70 and 12.08.
The role of r is critical for the countercyclical nature of the markups. The larger r, the
larger the banking economies of scale and the higher (lower) the probability of outsiders
operating at an efficient scale in a booming (recessionary) economy. In turn, this causes the
incumbent to set relatively lower (higher) markups. As orpected, in Table 3 we can observe
how the volatility of real variables monotically increases when r increases.
Welfare Results To measure how the welfare of the representative household is af-
fected by the presence of monopolistic power in the banking system, I solve the model using
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a second-order approximation as in Collard and Juilliard (2001). Otherwise, conventional
linearization can generate approximation errors that may be the cause of possible welfare
reversals (see Kim and Kim, 2003 for details). The welfare criterion considered here is
based on a second-order Taylor ocpansion ofthe representative household's expected utility
function (3.1), around the deterministic steady-state values.
Wt L-^l Lt?n
o,'l,{r*1-E(h,r) 
- 
tZrrt-1 E(4) 
- }r,o,.ftrl+r, E@}).
(2.21)
Where C and N are the steady-state values of consumption and labor and hats denote
percentage deviations from the steady state. In evaluating the welfare criterion, I firrd that
the percent increase in steady-state consumption that would make the household as well
off as it would be with perfect competition in the banking system is 10.23%. A monopo-
listic environment a,ffects welfare of the household through two different cha,nnels. Firstly,
the financial markup generates a permanent disintermediation between borrowers and en-
trepreneurs that results in lower steady-state levels of capital accumulation, output, and
consumption. Secondly, the countercyclical pattern of such markups increases the volatility
of real va,riables and thus reduces welfare.
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t2.9 Conclusions
The contestability of the retail banking sector is restricted by the requirement that entra,nts
must incur large sunk entry costs in highly segmented markets. This implies that the banks
must capture a significant fraction of the market right a,fter entering to make the entry
profitable. The idea of this paper is that limit pricing strategies aimed at deterring compe-
tition in banking retail niches are adopted when incumbents face an entry threat. During
recessions the actors in the local banking system a,re more able to exert their monopolistic
power, but boom periods lead to an expansion of the financial system that allows potential
entrants to operate at an efficient scale. Contestable markets force incumbents to lower
markups so as to deter entry. In turn, this generates countercyclical financial markups.
Using annual aggregate ba,nk data for a large set of countries for the period L990-
2001-, I find that financial markups are strongly countercyclical even after controlling for
simultaneity, financial development, banking concentration, operating costs, and inflation.
Since the threat of entry is a not a measurable concept, I use foreign penetration as a proxy. I
exploit the evidence that foreign bank entry initially takes place in the wholesale market with
the intention to expand later to the retail niches. I find that the entry (and not the presence)
of foreign ba,nks is the omitted variable that disentangles the cyclicality of the markups in
the empirical models. Using a regional a,nalysis, I find that the efficieucy gains resulting
from foreign entry are significant only in developing countries, in which banking systems
are usually small, riskier, and subject to considerable regulation. I interpret this to mean
that if entra,nts decide to participate in these local markets despite all these impediments,
the resulting threat of competition for retail niches is significantly larger.
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The modeling of the banking system captures several of the features of the empirical ev-
idence. In the theoretical model, entry occurs at the wholesale level and then spreads to the
retail level. The retail market is highly segmented into niches and the more effi.cient entrants
end up taking over current incumbents. Entry is procyclical and more likely to occur in
deregulated markets, but is more effective and successful if markets are regulated. Cha,nges
in the market structure do not affect the markups. Instead, the ma^rkups change because
the threat of entry forces incumbents to set rates that deter entry. Finally, economies of
scale facilitate entry in boom periods, a,nd vice versa) generating countercyclical markups.
At a general equilibrium level, the behavior of this imperfectly competitive financial system
generates a bank-supply channel that increases the volatility of real variables, amplifies the
business cycle, a.nd reduces welfare. Credit is more expensive during recessions, and firms
and households postpone investment and work decisions, thereby deepening the recession.
There are several extensions of the analysis that can be pursued in future work. Not
having access to banklevel disaggregated data was a considerable handicap for this study.
For instance, it would be interesting to study whether the regional markets that are more
concentrated, or have a lower degree of financial development, or are more regulated, have
different cyclical patterns. Additionally, the model could be extended to capture the con-
sequences of long-term relationships between banks a,nd customers. Efficiency gains from
fina,ncial liberalization and market de.segmentation may be offset by some importa,nt neg-
ative effects not considered in this study. An example is that regional banks are engaged
in long-term relationships with small domestic entrepreneurs that otherwise would have no
access to the credit market. Entry threats that force low margins ca,n increase the degree
of banking fragility a^nd disrupt these relationships.
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Appendix A: Proof of proposition 1.
Define the break-even level of margins 0,; and 0i for the incumbent and the entrant.
The break-even level is equal to the value ofthe net margin that provides them zero profits
when serving the niche. That is:
_ U,;
- 
0, and 0i
-ui -0. (A.1)
Now, let's analyze the case in which uj ) u,i., and thus 0i > 0t
Consider for enample, El+, > El*, > 0i. The bank i has no demand a,nd its profits are
zero.If bank i charges E3+r : Etnr-e (where e is positive but nil), it gets the entire nictre
arrd has a positive profit El*, 
- 
e 
- 
0.i ) 0.
Therefore bank j cannot be acting in its own interest by charging 3f*r. Now suppose
E3+r : Ei*, > d7. In that case they share the niche, a,nd each one serves half of it. But if
ba,nk j red.uces its price slightly to Ef*, 
- 
e, it gets all the niche. Nonetheless, bank j will
never cha,rg"Ei+, ( 97, because it would make a negative profit. It follows that bank i can
charge Ei+r : 0i 
- 
" 
and guarantee for itself all the niche while obtaining a positive profi.t
oj-r-fu)0.
Therefore bank j is indifferent between staying or leaving the niche, since will not be
able to serve it. If bank i offers ba"nk j a negligible but positive amount of output € so as
to merge, it is in the best interest of bank j to accept it. A symmetric analysis holds when
ui 1u*l
(*) '-"(*)('") '-"0i (*)
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Appendix B: Alternative Modeling Strategres
Here, I introduce monopolistic competition and endogenous cartel creation in the fi-
na.ncial system. This is the only novelty of this setup. Again, this modification creates a
disintermediation between borrowers and entrepreneurs that amplifies the response of the
real variables to technology shocks. Now I assume that the banking system is highly seg-
mented into a continuum [0, 1] of regions, each one served by a local branch, which is owned
by a commercial ba^nk. Since the geographical distance provides them with some market
power, I assume that each one faces its own downward sloping investment demand curve.
In addition, ba,nks are assumed to be monopolistically competitive.
Let I{z) be the amount to be financed by the bank located in region z. Hence, aggregate
investment, 
-I1, is a CES composite of the capital acquisition that is fina^nced by every
regional bra,nch:
It:llr' Ir(r)*or)* (2.22)
Cost minimization among entrepreneurs results in an isoelastic investment demand for
each regional branch:
(2.23)
Where ,f*r(r) is the net interest rate ctra,rged by each regional branch. Households do
r1(z)_(W) -'r,
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not face any transaction cost, and they a.re indifferent when choosing a fina.ncial institution.
Thus, I assume that banks are perfectly competitive when collecting households's deposits.T
Bank Cartel Let's assume that exists a finite number of bank cartels. Each cartel
behaves as a conglomerate and owns a fraction, e.g. [(, < + 6], of the continuum of regional
branches. Members of the ca.rtel jointly maximize profits. For simplicity, I assume that all
cartels a.re of the same size and owns the same fraction of brandres at anv time. In this
case, the static maximization problem for each cartel is:
I{z)dz (2.24)
In a symmetric equilibrium defined as rf*t(z) : rf+t,I find that each of the regional
ba^nks that belongs to the cartel, i.e. z e le,e +d, chooses a common gross markup,
(1+ ft*t), over the cost of funds, (L + 4-,.1), given by:
(1 + rf+) 
- 
(1 + Er+r)(t + rt+r). (2.25)
Where
TFor instance, households may open saving accounts through national online financial operators with
negligible transaction costs. Nonetheless, it is unquestionable that the proliferation of ATM's provides the
local institutions with monopsony power at the time of collecting deposits. I postpone this case for future
research.
fe+0
max I
,f(") J e
(1 + ,f+tQDlr(r)d,z 
-(1 + rt+t) ['*rJe
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(1 + Et+r) 
-
ff*r €",*d* * e (2.26)
ff*r€",*d**e-1'
tf (z) alt(4 is the cross-elasticity of substitution, and e is the constant own-Ez,a 
- 
-7'/.3 ArRz)
elasticity of substitution defined by the CES firnctional form in (2.22). For completeness, I
assume that f,+o e",rd,, + e > I.
Flom (2.26) we can observe that the larger the fraction of branches each cartel owns,
the higher the optimal markup to be charged in every regional branch. If the cartel did not
exist, the optimal non-collusive gross ma,rkup, (1 + Eifr) would be:
(t + zffr) ff*r er,*d** e
- 
(1 + Et+r) (2.27)
t*r€",*d**e-1
As a result, in this case of monopolistic competition, members of the cartel are always
better off when colluding. There a,re no incentives to walk out of the cartel and therefore
no need for punishment. The larger the fraction of regional banl<s that belong to the cartel,
the la,rger the profits for each of its member. The intuition for this result comes from the
theory of multi-product firms (i.e. conglomerates) in the field of industrial organization.
Financial intermediaries know that if interest rates are increased, some of the migrating
entrepreneurs will end up borrowing from members of the cartel rather than seeking firnds
in the competition.
Distant lending As in Rajan and Petersen (1995), transactions trough regional branches
allow banks to develop a credit relationship that ease the acquisition of "soft" (or tacit)
e: e-I
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information about borrowers' status. Moreover. advertisement and commercial costs mav
be significantly reduced when a branch is nea,rby.
Nonetheless, banks also have access to publicly available or "ha,rd" information. How-
ever, handling "hard" information demands larger monitoring costs, and costly updates at
the time of foreclosing loan renewals. Although banks may not require a branch to have
access to entrepreneurs, banks may need to incur in transactional a,nd advertisement costs
in order to lend at "a distance". I assume that for any bank, the cost of serving a regional
niche z at tta distance" is:
L(r)'-", (2.28)
the la,rger the pool of potential borrowers to serve at "a distance", the higher the
economies of scale, r, when gathering regional information and incurring in advertisement
costs.
To summa"rize, in period t* l,,the distant bank obtains the following ex-post real profits
for carrying the bank contract in region z at period t:
7t d,t+L 
- 
(1 + Et+r Xl + rt+r) Ir(r) - [tt * rt+t) Dr+tQ) + It(t)t-"] (2.2e)
The first term are entrepreneur payments, a,nd the term in brackets captures the cost
of funds (i.e. payment to depositors) plus the operating costs of serving at "a dista,nce".
Using the fact that in a symmetric equilibrium, D41(z): It(z), and that E1..'u1r1-,r1 = Q,
for the parameter values I consider here, we can express (2.29) as:
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nld,t+L 
- 
Et+ Jt(r) 
- 
I1(r)t-" (2.30)
Optimal size of the cartel In the baseline scenario, the incentive for the regional
banks is always to increase the size of the cartel. As mentioned before, the larger the
fraction of branches each cartel owns, the higher the implicit markup. To the contrary, the
possibility of '(dista^nt" lending imposes constraints on the cartel size. Flom equation (2.30),
we observe that if Et+t ) It(z)-", outsiders may be able to serve at "a distance" any of the
regional branches that belong to the cartel, oust the local bank, and still get a profit.
Investment demand increases in booms, and leads to orpa,nsion of the financial system
that allows outsiders to operate "at a distance" with an efficient scale. Therefore, the
sustainable size of the cartel and its implicit level markup decrease. Regional banks are
forced to walk out from large cartels and form relatively small ones in order to protect the
niches from "distant" competitors. A symmetric equilibrium implies that the markup level
that deters distant competition is given by the log-linear expression:
AA5t+t 
- 
-Trt (2.31)
Where hats denote percent-deviations from steady-state. FinaIIy, this markup pins down
the sustainable number of ca,rtels in (2.26).
The last result reminds the one in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). Namely, a cartel
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with high markups may not be sustainable in economic expansions. Besides, the number of
competing cartels decreases during recessions. This implication coincides with the empirical
evidence reflecting a decreasing number of players in the banking system, as well as, a,rr
increasing degree of bank consolidation during bad times.
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Chapter 3
Business Cycles and Monetary
Regimes in Ernerging Economies
with a Monopolistic Bankittg
Sector.
3.1 Introduction
Although there is a rast literature on monopolistic power in product and factor markets,
and also credit market imperfections, practically there is no research that considers the pos-
sibility of monopoly power in fina,ncial markets in a business cycle context. This possibility
is particularly relevant in developing economies, for three reasons. Firstly, banking remains
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a primary source of funds for entrepreneurs in those countries.l Secondly, consolidation of
the banking sector has been spurred by the liberalization of financial ma,rkets worldwide in
the last decades. Making use of large economies of scale, international banks have taken
over established banks in relatively small financial markets. Finally, empirical evidence in
real goods markets shows that markups are countercyclical. 2 If bank markups are also
countercyclical, this gives rise to a bank-supply channel that extends the credit channel to
reinforce the same vicious circle: Credit is more orpensive during recessions, so that firms
and households postpone investment, work, and consumption decisions a.nd thereby deepen
the recession. But while the sta^ndard version of the credit channel relies on the external
fina,nce problem that induces banks to charge a premium to cover the increase in expected
bankruptcy costs during recessions, the bank-supply channel is solely the result of imperfect
competition in the banking system.
In this last ctrapter, I set up a New Ke;mesian small open economy model with imperfect
competition in the banking system and countercyclical bank markups that amplifies and
propagates both real a"nd nominal external shocks. Following empirical evidence in Mandel-
man (2005), Iimit pricing strategies are the origin of these courtercyclical bank markups.
Limit pricing is the practice of setting prices at the limit level that deters entry. As shown
in Bain (1956), the price level in an industry strongly influences firms contemplating entry.
Thus, temporary low interest rates may not be the result of changes in the ba.nking struc-
ture but just the optimal entry-deterrence strategy for the incumbents. In this scenario,
1See, for instance, empirical evidence in Rojas.suares and Weisbrod (1994) and Catena (1996).
2For insta,uce, see Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and Chevallier and Sharfstein (1996) a.nong others.
Pigou (1927) and Keynes (1939) were the first ones to suggest that ma.rkups were countercyclical in real
goods markets.
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the threat of entry is the only reason to avoid profit maximization.
It is well-documented that bank penetration commonly takes place in the wholesale
ba^nking market initially and then orpands to the retail market.s The penetration into the
retail sector is obstructed, however, by the requirement of incurring large sunk entry costs
(for instance, large advertising expenditures or the construction of a network of branctres
and ATMs required to accommodate small transactions). This implies that banks need to
enter at a minimum-efficient-scale (MES) to justify the sunk costs incurred. Also, they must
capture a la.rge enough fraction of the market right after entering to make the constructed
network profitable. This is particularly difficult in the banking industry, in which the
markets are segmented into regional or sectorial niches.a In this scenario, the size of the
market constitutes a barrier to entry. If the financial ma"rket is small or underdeveloped
there is space for only a few incumbents operating at an efficient scale. Thus, boom periods
lead to an expansion of the financial system that attracts potential competitors who see
the possibility of operating at a,n efficient scale. In this situation, contestable markets force
incumbents to charge markups well below short-run profit maximizing levels so as to avoid
entry. In contrast, the competitive pressure decreases during recessions and the banks in the
local financial system are able to exert their monopolistic power by charging high markups.
To judge the empirical relevance of the setup, I conduct a quantitative exercise aimed
at replicating the volatility in real variables for a set of emerging economies in which bank
markups are sizable. The model succeeds at accounting for the high volatility of investment
registered in these countries, even in a context of flexible exchange rates and liabilities
sSee evidence in Claessens et al (2001).
nsee evidence in Petersen and Rajan (1994).
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denominated in local curency. Such "safeguards" are able to absorb the impact of external
shocks in models that have only the sta,nda.rd credit cha,nnel (i.e. balance-sheet effect),
which fails to deliver any amFlification mechanism.
This last chapter is orga^nized as follows. In section 2, I discnss the empirical evidence
and proceed with a literature review. In section 3, I introduce the model. In section 4,
I present the parameterization of the model and the solution method. I then describe
the transmission mechanism and undertake a welfare analysis. Concluding remarks are in
section 5.
3.2 Literature Review and Empirical Evidence
There exists a lengthy literature on the effect of balance sheets on borrower spending that
works to propagate external shocks as well as financial crises in emerging economies. Ex-
amples include: Aghion et al (2000), C6spedes et al (2000), Caballero a^nd Krishnamurty
(2000), Devereux and Lane (2003), Faia and Monacelli (2002), Christia,no et al (2002).
These contributions aim to capture an old idea of Keynes and Fisher who originally recog-
nized the imperfect nature of financial ma.rkets. This is that, deteriorating credit market
conditions like deflation-originated real debt burden increments and collapsing asset prices
(that alter collateral valuations a,nd default costs) a,re not only simply consequences of a
declining economy, but actually a major cause of the decline. My baseline model is closer to
Gertler et af (2003), who extend the standard New Keynesia^n small open economy fra,rrre.
work to include the credit channel as originally developed by Berna,nke et al (2000). In
addition, the introduction of nominal rigidities allows for exchange rate policy evaluation.
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Nonetheless, the internal propagation mechanism in these papers relies on either fixed ex-
change rate regimes or the presence of firms' liabilities denominated in foreign crurency.
With fixed exchange rates, the rise in either the country risk premium or foreign interest
tates causes an immediate rise in domestic interest rates. As a consequence, asset (and
collateral) values plummet and external finance risk premia rise, leading to a fall in in-
vestment that propagates the shock to the economy. A different approach to the role of
Ieverage positions is based on the "fear offloating" perspective that argues in favor offixed
exchange rates schemes. Liabilities are assumed to be mostly dollarized and the exchange
rate pass-trough rapid.s Although flexible exchange ratm offset the macroeconomic impact
trough a,n immediate depreciation of the local currency, liabilities denominated in foreign
currency and revenues denominated in domestic cunency boost firms' leverage ratio and
increase the risk premia.
Regarding the study of the bank-supply channel to be introduced here, the first step is
to find a proper measure for markups in the banking industry data. A simple approach is to
consider the ex-ante (posted) spread or difference between lending and deposit rates, as a
proxy for financial markups. The difficulty here is that the spread also includes a premium
to cover the expected borrowers' ba,nkruptcy costs, which is the core of the standard credit
channel.
The so-called risk premium has the sole intention of covering these expected bankruptcy
costs. We expect that, in the long run, aggregate bank income obtained from such risk
premia charges actually match banks'loan default costs. Therefore, I consider annual banks'
balance sheet ex-post data that accounts for defaulted loans to proxy for net markups. In
usee for instance Calvo and Mendoza (2000), and Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
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pa,rticular, I will use net interest margins (NIM), equal to bank's total interest income minus
interest expense divided by total assets after subtracting defaulted loans. As explained in
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998), bank interest margins can be seen as an indicator of
the pure inefficiency of the banking system.6 Table L presents some descriptive statistics on
ex-post ma,rgins for a selected group of emerging and developed economies. A lower degree
of financial development not only results in much greater average interest ma.rgins for the
former group (as expected) but also in more volatile margins both in absolute and relative
terms.
Practically all the evidence on cyclicality is focused on ex-ante spreads.T An exception is
Mandelman (2005), in which dynamic panel estimates show that in emerging countries err-
post margins are strongly countercyclical, even a,fter controlling for financial development,
banking concentration, operating costs, inflation, and simultaneity or reverse causation. In
emerging economies, this countercyclical pattern is explained by the entry of foreign banks
that occurs during booms. Entry, which mostly happens at wholesale level, signals the
intention to enter later into the retail niches and, as I understand, triggers limit pricing
strategies in concentrated financial markets. This evidence motivates the modeling of the
banking system presented in Mandelman (2005), a.nd is the source of the bank-supply
channel in this paper.
6For mo.e details, see Mandetman (2005).
7See, for instance, Hannan and Berger (1991) and Edwards and Vegh (1997) and Olivero (2004)' Simila,rly'
Angelini and Cetorelli (2000) use GDP growth as a control variable in the estimation of Lerner indexes.
However, none of these studies settles the issue of causality and endogeneity.
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3.3 The Model
I start from a sta^ndard small open economy framework with monopolistic competition
and nominal rigidities, in the spirit of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999) and Svensson (2000),
and include the financial accelerator mectranism that links the condition of the borrower
balance sheets to the terms of credit as developed in Gertler et af (2003). The novel feature
of my setup is the inclusion of an imperfectly competitive domestic banking system, which
acts as an intermediary between the households' savings and the wholesalers' financial
requirements.
Within the home economy there are households, firms, a banking sector and a monetary
authority. Foreign variables are considered to be exogenous. Households work, save, and
consume two groups of tradable goods that are produced at home and abroad a,nd are
imperfect substitutes.
There are three types of home firms: wholesalers, capital producers and retailers. Due
to imperfections in financial markets, the wholesalers' dema^nd for capital depends on their
respective financial positions. This capital is used with labor to produce raw output. Banks
serve as the sole source of funds to finance capital acquisition. Competitive capital pro-
ducers manufacture new capital a"nd adjustment costs lead to a va,riable price of capital.
FinaIIy, retailers package wholesale goods together to produce final output. They are mo-
nopolistically competitive and set nominal prices on a staggered schedule. The role of the
retail sector is simply to provide the source of nominal price stickiness.
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3.3.1 Households
The household sector is conventional. There is a
Each household works, consumes, and invests its
bonds denominated in foreign currency.
The representative household muimizes:
continuum of households of unit ma,ss.
savings in regular deposits and foreign
oor
nrf p'l t a!-^l
'a' lt- 'r"t
Subject to the budget constraint:
ct:VHt*rI1 
-
ft"'y"1 (3.1)
(3.2)Dt+t-(1 +'it-_r)D, stBi+l - stot(l +iI-_)Br
P1Pt
With 7 ) 0, and .yn ) 0.Ct is a composite of tradable final consumption goods; -FIt
is labor supply; l[ denotes the nominal wage; P1 is the consumer price indor (CPI); II1
are real dividend payments (from ownership of commercial banks a,nd retail firms); D1
are deposits in local currency held at commercial ba^nks; B! arc foreign nominal bonds
denominated in foreign currency; ,5t the nominal exchange rate. (1 + 4) and (1 + tf ) are
the gross domestic and foreign nomina,l interest rates. iDl is the gross borrowing premium
that domestic residents must pay to obtain funds from abroad. I assume that the country's
borrowing premium depends on foreign indebtness, that is U : f (-B;). The elasticity
of Ot with respect to 
-Bi is positive to avoid non-stationarity of the stock of foreign
liabilities. However, it is set close to zero to avoid altering the high-frequency dynamics
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of the model. Since I assume that the intermediary cannot distinguish a household from a
risky entrepreneur, all household deposits are redirected to entrepreneurs. The household
ca,n dissave by holding negative positions of foreign bonds.
Consumption Composites The household's preferences over home consumption,
C{, ar.d foreign consumption, C{ are defined by a CES index:
cf ^Yc (Pf\-e
C{: L- "2\F{ )
wt n-''r 
-trc;t : anHT''
(3.3)
The corresponding consumer price index, Pt, is:
Pt: ft"@{)'-o + (1 - -y) (p{)'-')* ,
Optimality Conditions Household behavior obeys:
Consumption allocation:
Labor allocation:
(3.4)
(3.5)
(3.6)
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Consumption and saving intertemporal allocation:
1- gE,{ (h) 't1 +,')*} (3.7)
Finally, the optimality condition governing the
(3.7), yields the followitg uncovered interest parity
choice of foreign bonds, combined with
condition:
(P14tc;i'.;
- 
ot (1 + z*' S'+rl I;)jz#-lj-oftt *,,y (3.8)
3.3.2 Firms
Wholesalers
Wholesalers are risk neutral and acquire capital in each period for use in the subsequent pe.
riod. I a,ssume that they have a finifs e:(psqtred horizon. This assumption is aimed to capture
the phenomenon of ongoing births and deaths of firms, as well as to discard the possibility
that wholesalers will ultimately accumulate enough wealth to be firlly self-fina,ncing. The
probability of surviving to the next period is (. In other words, the expected horizon is
tf . t assume the birth rate of wholesalers to be such that the fraction of agents who are
wholesalers is constant. To ensure that new wholesalers have funds available when starting
out, I follow Bernanke et aI (2000) a,nd assume that eadr wholesaler is endowed with Hf
units of labor which is supplied inelastically as a marragerial input to production. Wf is
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received in compensation. Capital is used in combination with labor to produce wholesale
goods. The labor input Z1 is assumed to be a composite of household and ma,nagerial labor:
Lt: H?Hi(l-o). (1 
- 
O) is positive but negligible in size. I normalize Iff to unity.
The project is subject to an idiosyncratic shock, t,rs, that affects both the production of
new goods and the effective quantity of the capital in use. The shock ut may be regarded
as a mea,sure of the overall quality of the capital investment. I assume that u1 is an i.i.d.
random variable, distributed continuously v/ith ,E {rt]r : 1. I also a,ssume Cobb-Douglas
technology. The last two assumptions allow me to express the aggregate production function
as:
Yt 
- 
AtK?_rLI-o,
where Y1 is the aggregate output of wholesale goods, Kt-r is the aggregate amount of
capital purchased by wholesalers in period t 
- 
I, L1 is labor input, and At is an e>rogenous
technology shock.
Let P14t,1, be nominal price of wholesa,le goods. Then, labor demand satisfies,
(3.9)
(3.10)
(3.11)
and
Y(1 
- 
o)o#rr*,t:Wt,
(1 
-o)(1 - 
")#Pw,t-wf .
69
Demand of New Capital The wholesalers finance the acquisition of capital partly
with their own net worth available at the end of period t and partly with the bank credit
redirected from household deposits, D1.,-1. Capital financing is split between net worth, .lft,
and credit:
Q1 is the real market price of capital in units of the household consumption composite. Net
worth may be interpreted as the equity of the firm. I assume that new equity a,nd bond
issues a,re prohibitively e>rpensive, or not available for local firms, so that all external finance
is done with bank credit. I ignore the possible oristence of retained reserves, so that the
overall arrount of credit in the economy must be equal to the overall a,mount of household
deposits. As previously remarked, all credit is in units of domestic cuffency.
Due to constant returns to scale, the marginal return to capital equals its average return.
Jointly with the assumptions on the idiosyncratic shock, (tt,we can write the orpected gross
return to holding a unit of capital from I to f * 1 as:
QtKt- lrr ' Dt+t
-Pt
Et(1 + ,f+t): EtL (1 - ol 
.l
-l
(3.12)
Pw,t+t aYt+t r fi. 
-WTTwt+l (3.13)
Qt
Supply of New Capital The marginal cost of funds to the wholesaler depends on the
financial conditions and the banking structure. Following Bernanke et al (2000), I assume
the existence of an external finance problem that makes uncollateralized octernal fi.nance
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more expensive. As in Gale and Hellwig (1985), I assume the existence of a costly state
verification problem. In this case, the idiosyncratic shock tr1, is private information for
the entrepreneur. A detailed ercplanation of the agency problem for a monopolistic ba"nk
is in Appendix A. It is shown there that the external finance risk premium, t!6 may be
expressed as an increa.sing function of the leverage ratio. Essentially, the external finance
risk premium varies inversely with the wholesaler's net worth. The greater the share of
capital that can be self-fina,nced, the smaller the expected bankruptcy costs, and thus the
smaller the risk premium:
,h, (.) : ,h
7 Dt+r \(,*,-J , (3.14)
,h'(.) >0, 1b(0)-0, d(o")-oo.
Notice that tl4(.) depends exclusively on the aggregate leverage ratio and not on any
wholesaler-specific variable. In equilibrium, all entrepreneurs choose the same leverage ratio,
which is the result of both constant returns to scale in production and risk neutrality (for
details, see Carlstrom and F\rerst, 1997). Equation (3.1a) is the basis ofthe standard credit
channel (also referred to as the balance-sheet-effect). It links movements in the wholesalers'
balance sheet positions to the marginal cost of credit and, thus, to the demand of capital.
As stressed in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), endogenous fluctuations in the price of capital,
Qt, may have significant efiects on the leverage mtio, ff /Nr: o# / (QrX, - "#)
Finally, in equilibrium, the allocation of new capital satisfies the following optimality
7T
condition:
Equation (3.15) is the critical component of my model. The wholesalers'overall marginal
ex-ante cost of funds is the product of three different terms. a {tf + u) #\: (1 * r1a1)
indicates the bank's gross cost of funds (i.e. the real interest rate paid to depositors), r/r(.) is
the premium aimed to cover expected ba.nkruptcy costs, and (1 * Ft+r) is the gross financial
ma.rkup an intermediary bank with monopoly power cha,rges for carrying and executing the
contract. If such markup were zero , the bank would earn a return equal to the safe rate
that households receive for their deposits (see Appendix A for details). Net interest margins
proxy for E1".1 in the data and reflect the disintermediation generated by the banking system.
The bank spread proxies for the combined effects of tbt(.) and (1 * Et+r).
To define the evolution of entrepreneurial aggregate net worth, let % denote the value
of the ex-post real return on capital net of ex-post borrowing costs:
E,(1 + ,f+r) 
- 
(1 + Et+r )rbrO Er{ ,t *it, Oft}
vt-(1 + rf)Qr-tKt-r 
- fft*Et)rht-r(.) (1 +,it-rrT)i:
(3.15)
(3.16)
(3.17)
While unforecastable variation in assets prices, Q1, is the main source of una,nticipated
returns, unexpected CPI variation plays the same role for the liabilities. Finally, aggregate
net worth is the result of a linea,r combination of % and the managerial wage:
lrt 
- 
eV +Wf lPt,
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Exiting wholesalers in period t consume their remaining resources: Cf : (1 
- 
C)%. I assume
that wholesalers have preferences over domestic and foreign goods identical to household's
preferences.
Capital Producers
The construction of new capital requires as input an investment good, 11, that is a composite
of domestic a,nd foreign final goods:
It:
pt-r 1(If)T+(1 
-t)tr[t',1# (r!\+1*\v, ) (3.18)
Competitive capital producers choose the optimal mix
accorditrg to the intra-temporal first-order-condition:
of foreign and domestic inputs
^Yt
L 
-'yt
(3.19)
Therefore, the investment price index, PI,t, is given by
Prft:lt, @f)'-o' + (1 - tr) @{)r-Pr] 
-
(3.20)
I assume that there are increasing marginal adjustment costs in the production of capital.
Capital producers operate a consta,nt returns to scale technology that yields a gross output
of new capital goods . (*) K1-1, for an aggregate investment expenditure of [. V(.) is
4r
ry (#) 
-"
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increasing a,nd concave. Kt-t is the second input in capital production. Capital producers
rent this capital a,fter it has been used to produce final output within the period. Let r!
denote the rental rate for the existent capital. Then profits equal:
(3.21)
In order to capture the delayed response of investment observed in the data, I follow
Bernanke et al (2000) and assume that capital producers make their plans to produce new
capital one period in advance. Therefore, the optimality conditions for the choices of .I1 and
Kt-r yields:
etv (*)*,-, - '#I1 -,1,K,
E6-, {c,v' (*) -'#}:0,
E,-, {0, L.n e-,)- .p/ (*) *] } - rl
(3.22)
(3.23)
There are no adjustment costs in the steady state, so that V (+) : * *d V' (+) : l.
It also follows that Q is normalized to one and, hence, rental payments are second order
a,nd negligible in terms of both steady-state and model dynamics. Equation (3.22) implies
that Ql increases i" * as predicted by standard Q theory of investment. The adjustment
costs generate a variable price of capital, crucial for the balance-sheet-effect.
The resulting economy wide capital accumulation is:
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The Retail Sector and Price Setting
Monopolistic competition occurs at the retail level. Retailers buy wholesale goods and
differentiate products by packaging them together and adding a bra,nd name.
LetYtH (z) be the good sold by retailer z. Final good domestic output is a CES composite
of individual retail goods:
Kt:. (*) *,-r * (1 - 6)Kt-t,
where 6 is the depreciation rate.
Yr' :l tt 
"r'(r)?dr1LJo s \' )
The price of the composite final domestic good., P{r, is given by:
Y,,(,)-(ffi-'Yf
(3.24)
(3.25)
(3.27)
(3.26)
Domestic households, capital producers, and the foreign country buy final goods from
retailers. Cost minimization results in an isoelastic demand for each retailer:
Pr' :Vr' ,r,(r)t-ror)
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To introduce price inertia, f assume that the retailer is free to change its price in a
given period only with probability L 
- 
d, following Calvo (1983). Let Pf;, denote the home
production price set by retailers that are able to change prices at f, and YflQ) the resulting
demand at this price level. Retailer z chooses her price to maximize expected discounted
profits, given by:
(3.28)
The discount rate A1,6 : t (3a*-)" i" th" household or "shareholder" intertemporal
ma,rginal rate of substitution. Because the price may be fixed for some time, retailers set
prices based on the orpected future path of ma,rginal cost. The optimal price, P{.1satisfies:
irrtr[n, ,-P{"- Pwl+r'YH,,, I7-g L't'nffY{*r'nl
___i,*r,{n,,-(#)-'Yf;,,*r(,)lrrr- (*"'')] )
where 1$ is the retailers' desired gross markup over
fraction 0 of retailers do not change their price in period t
according to:
-0, (3.2e)
wholesale prices. Given that a
the domestic price index evolves
Pf :ltell,)'-'+(1 
- Ee{,) '-*] +
By combining the last two equations, and then log-linearizing,
(3.30)
it is possible to obtain
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the familiar optimization-based Phillips curve that a,rises from an environment of time.
dependent staggered price setting.
f assume that the law of one price holds for foreign goods sold in the domestic market:
P{ 
- 
StPf . (3.31)
Then, it is possible to obtain an economy-wide inflation, combining equation (3.4) with
the results above.
In Appendix B, I consider the case in which local currency pricing results in a delay in
the exchange rate pass-through mechanism. There, I simply assume that imported goods
prices are adjusted in the sarne manner as prices in the domestic sector.
3.3.3 The Banking System
I assume that the banking system is highly segmented into a large number, n, of sectors
or regions (niches). The size of each niche is the same, and each of them is served by a,n
established ba,nk (incumbent), J, that possesses a local monopoly and therefore fina,nces an
Dt+r
equal fraction +- of the total entrepreneurial capital acquisition. Each incumbent can
serve only its own niche because of a,n implicit collusion agreement that is described later.
This intermediary chooses a net markup for its niche, 86..1, at the beginning of period t. I
assume that the cost of serving the niche for each bank I is:
/ Dr+, \ l-t
U7 I " I\n /
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(3.32)
The consta^nt ul is the cost-efficiency level, and captures any idiosyncratic operational
(in)efficiency and information (dis)adva,ntages any ba,nk may have. I assume that u1 is
drawn from a cornmon uniform distribution U(u) with support on [0, )] at the beginning of
the bank operations. u; is private information and is unknown to banks outside the niche.
The cost of serving depends on the amount of credit fina,nced (the size of the market).
In addition, the ba^nking system possesses operational economies of scope and scale over
operating costs. Thus, I assume that 0 < r < 1.
For notational ease, I assume that the operational costs depend on the real amount of
credit financed at t (i.e. ff), but are effectively incurred at the time profits are realized.
Therefore in period t * 1 the bank obtains the following ex-post real profits for carrying
and monitoring the bank contract (between depositors and entrepreneurs) at period f:
The first term are the entrepreneur payments net of ba^nkruptcy costs and the term in
brackets captures the cost of funds (i.e. payments to depositors) plus operating costs. Using
the fact that the oc-post real rate is (1 * rt+t) : (L + i,)+, and that Et+rrt+r = 0 for
the parameter values I consider, we can express (3.33) as:
.rr,t+L: (1 +Et+r)(r +e,) (+) / 
Dt+r \( pt+t l*r,
\n /
-u1 (+) '-'
(+) '-"]
(+)
(3.33)
(3.34)'lTl,t+L : 5t+1
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Figure 3-L: Entry Stages
Entry and mergers I assume that entry is possible in this banking system, but that it
occlus in successive stages. Entrants in the "banking system" at time t only start competing
in the "niche" at time t * L, which introduces a one-period time-to-build lag in the model.
Right a,fter the entry decision is effectively taken (i.e. when the sunk costs are incurred),
the entrant is already inside the banking system, but only at the "wholesale level". Hence,
in principle, during period t it is able to temporarily serve a,ny of the n niches until it is
finally established in one of them in t * L. The aim is to capture the idea of entry taking
place in the wholesale market first with the ultimate goal of spreading later to the retail
segment (niches).8
The entry stages a,re as follows:
(A) At the beginning of period t, a potential competitor, j, attempts to enter the banking
sAdditionally, we could say that entrants need to incur in one.period lea.rning process to make their
idiosyncratic cost-efficiency level effective at the regional level.
lntry inlc llrr
'nich*". tJ, is
rtYtQdcd.
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system. At no cost, it draws its cost-efficiency level, u7, from the same common uniform
distribution U(u).
(B) After learning its own ui, the potential competitor chooses whether to enter the
banking system and fight for one of the niches nent period or to withdraw from the ba,nking
system. The closer u3 is to zero, the more efficient the potential entrant is, and the easier
to take over a niche. I assume that the number of total draws is large enough that at least
some potential competitors enter the banking system every period.
(C) To enter the banking system (and eventually fight for one ofthe niches) an outsider
has to incur fixed sunk entry costs, rr4, at the beginning of period t.9 *, is exogenous and
measured in units of the consumption composite. We can also interpret changes in rn1 as
changes in entry regulations.
(D) k principle, during period f, entrants are able to temporarily serve any (or
all) of the n niches at the "wholesale level" until finally established in one of them.
cost of serving other niches at the wholesale level is:
even
The
/ Dt+t \ L-r){Tl 
,\TLI\/
(3.35)
where ,\ ) u; for every l; given the common uniform distribution U(u) with support
on [0,,\]. As in Petersen and Raja^n (1994), I assume that retail banks that a,re physically
eAs mentioned above, we can include in them advertisement costs or the costs of constructing a network
of branches and ATMs.
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closer to their customers have lower costs of tra.nsacting with both firms a,nd depositors.
(E) For simplicity, I assume that any entrant is able to enter only one of the niches (i.e.
multi-sectorial entry is not possible). The collusion agreement implies that the potential
competitor knows the cost-efficiency distribution of the banking system, U(u), but cannot
infer the particular uls of each incumbent. So that, entrants a^re indifferent about the niche
to fight for. I assume that once inside the banking system they randomly choose which
particular niche to enter at the end of period t.
(F) At the very beginning of period , + 1 , the entrant is inside the niche and is able to
Iearn the incumbent's u1. Bertrand competition occurs and the following proposition holds:
PROPOSITION L Und,er Ber-tmnd, competition, only two possible outumes are pos-
si,ble. If ui ) u7, the entrant fails and, is forced, to merge. If ui < u1 the entrant successfully
d,isplaces the incumbent and forces it to merge. The optimal stmtegy for the loser is to merge
i,mmedi,ately and, not to rcmpete. The only ui,sible outume is the possible change of the i,n-
cumbent at the uery begi,nni,ng of t + 7.10
Proof. See Appendix C.
(G) If successful the new incumbent keeps the niche until it is hit by an exit-inducing
shock that occlus with probability 6p 
€ 
(0,1) in every period. For simplicity, I do not
model endogenous exit that is not driven by the afore mentioned Bertrand competition.
The "death" shock is independent of the bank's efficiency level. I assume that the empty
niche left by every dead bank is immediately filled by u,n entrant. Right a,fter drawing an
toBy definition the point likelihood of uj : ul is null.
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efficiency level, the entrant is able to use the existent network left by the dead bank (avoiding
any sunk costs as well as the time-to.build lag). The number of banks and the frequency of
"death" is high enough so that E(u) :4, and U(u) describes the cost-efficiency distribution
of all incumbents in the fina,ncial svstem.
Implicit Collusion Agreement and Limit Pricing I assume that entra,nts are
liquidity constrained and cannot make looses after incurring sunk costs. In these circum-
stances, the pricing strategy, Et+r, must ensure that none of the new competitors at the
wholesale level can obtain any expected positive profits if they decide to offer a net markup
below E;a1 and serve the niche.ll That is:
Et+r (3.36)
Notice, however, that low cost-efficiency incumbents have the incentive to "signal" their
idiosyncratic efficiency to new entrants by offering a markup below the level that makes
(3.36) hold as an equality (hereafter, the binding limit). Ftom (3.34), entrants in the
banking system know that only more efficient incumbents can offer a markup, E1.r1, weII
/n \-t
below I \vf ln) and still make profits. Therefore, these incumbents have incentives to
offer markups levels somewhat below the binding limit in (3.36) to influence and redirect
entrants' decisions toward less-effi.cient niches. The higher is the amount of entry in the
banking system, the higher the incentives to protect the niche by lowering current markups
and profits. In this scenario, incumbents "compete" to deter entry in their own nictres.
11By assumption, the customers remain loyal to the local incumbent bank if the level of the markup ofrered
is the snme.
(#) <^ (+) '-"
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IInstead, I assume that there exists an implicit collusion agreement among the incumbents
that enforces the secrecy of the idiosyncratic cost-efficiency levels.
f assume that any implicit collusion agreement must necessarily satisfy all the incum-
bents to be possible. Consequently, a cartel markup below the binding limit in (3.36) does
not work. The uniform distribution with support on [0,,\], and the assumption that n. is
very large, implies that such cartel markup level can result in losses for members with cost-
efficiency levels in the neighborhood of ). The negative profits force defections from the
agreementl defections that actually reveal the high cost-efficiency level of those defectors.l2
Therefore, the a,rrangement must consist of a markup equal to the binding limit in (3.36):
(3.37)
If any of the banks attempt to charge a markup below the binding limit, one of the
members of the ca.rtel immediately serves such niche at the wholesale level. The punishment
consists of establishing a markup just below the one chosen by the defector, #, - e (e is
negligible in size). The resulting negative profits for serving the niche under this condition
are equally distributed arnong the members of the cartel. That is,
(=i{,-,) (+ t 
") - ) (+ t ")\-r
/2H\ / D+\ t-"E,+r(.+j 
-^(.+J
n-I <0. (3.38)
I assume that, in principle, such punishment would take place only if there is a single
t2I ass,t-e that a single defector can transform the tacit agreement into an explicit one. As in Rotemberg
and Woodford (L992), such scenaxio ca,rries incommensurable legal sanctions for the members of the cartel.
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Imonopolistic bank serving the niche (so that Proposition t holds). In other words, the
cartel allows Bertrand competition to occur inside the niche to gua,rantee a monopolistic
structure in which the number of banks in the ba,nling system never exceeds n (one bank
per niche). Finally, I assume that the amount of entry and the exogenous exit inducing
shock (positively associated with the discount factor) is high enough so that incumbents
are better off when committing to the collusive level in (3.37).
As a result, the pricing decision is exactly the same in all niches. Since all the niches
are of the same size, we can interpret this relationship as the pricing decision taken by the
representative bank of this economy.
Hence, for every period f, expected profits for each incumbent I are:
,'t,t+L: (r 
-u1, (+) '-" > o. (3.3e)
Equations (3.37) and (3.39) can be interpreted as follows: The greater the aggregate
investment, the bigger the size of all niches, and the higher the competitive pressure of the
new entrants. In turn, this forces the incumbent to offer lower markups. These countercycli-
cal ma,rkups, jointly with the standard balance-sheet-effect, constitute the "broad" financial
accelerator at work in equation (3.15). Relative to the standard credit channel, this "broad"
accelerator magnifies the propagation and amplification of shocks to the economy.
Entry decision Banks are forward looking and correctly a,nticipate their enpected
stream of profits. After drawi\g a uj, a potential entrant decides to enter the ba.nking
system only ifthe expected post-entry present discounted net value ofthe expected stream
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of profits {nj,t}E, is positive:
Vj,, : _6n)r"-'(+) -'
- 
TTLs > 0. (3.40)tr,"*, )
(oo
t":tpG (r- ?)
Banks discount future profits using the household's stochastic discount factor, adjusted
for the probability of survival The pre'entry probability of defeating the incumbent a,nd
taking-over the niche is L 
- 7 : Pr(ri < E(ui). Equations (3.a0) and (3.39) imply that
entry is procyclical (i.e. entry increases when the amount of credit, purchase of new capital
and the economic activity are high). The larger the discount factor and the probability of
the exit-inducing shock, the stronger the procyclicality.
Entry is a,fiected by market regulation that alters the value of ml.r3 Equation (3.40)
implies that the higher is rn1, the lower the resulting entry threshold value of u7, and thus
the lower the amount of entry in the banking system (a,nd vice versa). But, the higher is
m1, the more likely entries a,re successful when fighting for the niche. These results are in
line with the empirical evidence that entry exerts a sizable impact in small, underdeveloped,
and regr:lated markets.
The government ca,n effectively prohibit entry in the banking system by setting rnt "+ @.
In this case, countercyclical limit pricing is not necessary, and incumbents are able to
establish a standa,rd collusive agreement.
13As in Ghironi and Melitz (2005), changes in sunk entry costs alter the free'entry condition.
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3.3.4 The Foreign Sector
The small open economy takes all foreign variables as given. I use a very simple for-
eign demand for the home tradable, or exports, Cf " with an inertia component given by
lC{:ir--. Following Gertler et aI (2003), I postulate a,n empirically sensible reduced-form
export demand curve:
cf*_[t*) -" I nH*1L--L"t-11 t 0 < @ < 1,
"r)_ (3.41)
Pf is the nominal price of the foreign tradable good (in units of the foreign currency)
and Yf is real foreign output. I assume balanced trade in the steady state and normalize
the steadv-state terms of trade at unitv.
3.3.5 The Resource Constraint
The resource constraint for the domestic traded good sector is:
Yf-Cf+cfH+cf.+If (3.42)
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3.3.6 Monetar5r Policy Rules
I first consider shocks to the economy under a floating orchange rate regime, in which the
central bank manages the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor rule. In this case, the
policy instrument is the nominal interest rate. The central bank adopts a flexible inflation
targeting rule that has the nominal interest rate adjust to deviations of CPI inflation and
domestic output from their respective target values. Let Y0 denote the steady-state level
of output. The feedback rule is given by:
(3.43)
with 7r, ) L and la ) 0, and where (1 + r) is the steady-state gross real interest rate.
The target net rate of inflation is assumed to be zero. The central bank therefore adjusts
the interest rate to ensure that over time the economy meets the inflation target, but with
flexibility in the short run so as to meet stabilization objectives. I assume that the central
bank is able to credibly commit to the Taylor rule.
I then consider a pure fixed excha^nge rate regime in which the central bank simply keeps
the nominal exchange rate pegged at a predetermined level, i.e.
St : 5,, for all t. (3.44)
With the description of the monetary policy, the specification of the model is complete.
The distinctive aspect of this general equilibrium model relative to a benchmark small open
economy (SOE) setup with nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition in real goods
(1 +,it):(1 +r) (*) '" (vt'\ t'\F/
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markets is ctraracterized by equations (3.37), (3.17) and (3.15). The first one determines
the limit pricing strategy chosen by the incumbent banks, the second one cha,racterizes the
evolution of net worth, and the last one describes how the combined feedback effect of these
two events influences capital demand. If we restrict the net financial markup, E1-.1, to zero
in (3.15), we effectively shut off the bank-supply channel and the model reverts to a SOE
model with the conventional financial accelerator included ( i.e. with only the standard
bala,nce-sheet-effect). Simila^rly, this last effect may be turned off by restricting tfil to one
in (3.15).
3.4 Solution of the Model
3.4.L Model pararneterization
The quantitative analysis aims to capture the broad features of a representative emerging
economy for which financial frictions are releva.nt. I set the world interest rate to 4 percent
a,nnually, an number commonly used in the literature, which also pins down the quarterly
discount factor B at 0.99. I follow Galf and Monacelli (2005) and set the Flisctr intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in labor supply, L*, at 3. Average hours worked relative to total
hours available are fixed at I in steady state, which is the standard value in the Real
Business Cycle (RBC) literature. Empirical evidence establishes low sensitivity of expected
consumption growth to real interest rates in emerging economies. Therefore I fix 1 : {,
which is in line with intertemporal elasticity estimates found in Reinhart and Vegh (1993)
and Uribe (1997).
I set the intratemporal elasticity of substitution for the consumption composite, p, at
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0.5. Since consumption goods are thought to have a higher degree of substitution than
intermediate or investment goods, I mimic Gertler et al (2003) and fix the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution for the investment composite, p1, at 0.25. Finally, I follow C6spedes
et al (2000) and assume that the share of domestic goods in the consumption and investment
tradable composites, 16 and .yr, ile both 0.6, consistent with observed sha,res.
I assign the conventional values of0.35 and 0.025 to the capital share, o, and the steady
state quarterly depreciation rate, 6, respectively. As in Galf a,nd Monacelli (2005), I set the
steady-state markup in the tradable goods markets at 1.2. The elasticity of the price of
capital with respect to the investment capital ratio is taken to be 2, which is the estimate
that King and Wolman (1996) found using aggregate data. As common in the literature on
Calvo pricing, I assume that the probability of the price not adjusting, d, is 0.75. The ratio
of capital to net worth in the steady state is set at 2 (or equivalently, a leverage ratio of 0.5).
This steady-state leverage ratio is the one chosen in Bernanke et al (2000) and is also in
line with new estimations Kamil (2004) found for a set of emerging economies. I assume a
low degree of financial development with high bankruptcy and monitoring costs, therefore I
set the steady-state annual external finance risk premium at 4.5To, roughly 250 basis points
higher than U.S. historical data. Following, Bernanke et al (2000), I choose the elasticity
of the external finance premium with respect the leverage ratio, 4, to be 0.051 and the
entrepreneurs' death rate, (1 
- 
() equal to 0.0272. I also fix the entrepreneurial labor share
of the total wage bill at a negligible 0.07%. In order to assess the quantitative relevance of
the monopolistic banking setup, I replicate the data in Table L. Thus, I set the steady-state
annual value of the net financial markup at 380 basis points and then calibrate z so that
its standard deviation (as a percent deviation from the steady-state value) is around 23%.
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Regarding the parameters of the reduced-form export demand function, I set the elas-
ticity y equal to 0.3 and the inertia parameter, a, equal to 0.25 which is the same value as
in Gertler et al (2003). The steady-state ratio of exports to domestic output is set equal to
0.3.
The Taylor RuIe coefficients on CPI inflation and domestic output gap, ln and 7r, are
set equal to 2 and 0.75, respectively, in line with a range of standard estimates.
3.4.2 Fioreign interest rate shock
I first analyze the transmission mechanism of this setup. In order to capture a sudden
capital outflow, I consider an unanticipated one hundred basis point increase in the foreign
nominal interest rate that obeys a first order auto-correlation process that persists at the
rate of 0.9 per qua.rter.
The model cannot be solved analytically so I employ numeric methods. I find the rational
expectations equilibrium of the log-linear approximation around the steady state and obtain
the recursive equilibrium law of motion using the method of undetermined coefficients.
In Figure 2, I plot the response of twelve key variables assuming perfect competition
in the banking system under flexible exchange rates. I consider both the sta.ndard SOE
model (dashed line) and the same model with the conventional financial accelerator included
(solid line). In other words, bank markups remain at zero throughout the experiment.
In this case, the domestic nominal interest rate is not tied to the foreign interest rate,
and is instead governed by the feedback rule in equation (3.43). The rise in the foreign
interest rate produces an immediate depreciation in the domestic crurency which in turn
prompts an increase in the foreign dema,nd for home production. Household consumption
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falls owing to the increased cost of imported goods following the depreciation. Incomplete
substitution causes consumption in domestic goods to fall, as well as the price of domestic
goods. However, consumption of domestic goods falls by less than consumption of imported
goods which, jointly with higher exports, moderates the overall effect on local output. The
counteracting effects of lower domestic prices but more expensive imports causes the overall
CPI inflation rate to increase only slightly. Given the Taylor rule specification, a small
output drop jointly with moderate inflation dictates a negligible change in the real interest
rate. Negligible changes in real rates and modest changes in the inflation rate imply that
neither asset prices nor the real value of the liabilities are significantly altered. With the
critical assumption of liabilities exclusively denominated in local currency, such behavior
of the balance sheets implies that the balance-sheet-effect is negligible and the o<ternal
finance premium wholesalers face is insignificant. Consequently, the drop in investment is
moderate, and reflects only a lower price for capital as a result ofthe recessive outlook and
a relatively more eD(pensive foreign investment good composite.l4
Therefore, the standard financial accelerator fails to deliver any amplification and prop
agation medranism in this context. In principle, flexible exchange rates and liabilities fully
denominated in local currency allow the economy to isolate itself from foreign interest rate
shocks. Existent models are forced to include liabilities mostly denominated in foreign
currency to improve upon their empirical performa,nce.
The results are difierent if we also recognize the presence of monopoly power in the
banking system. See Figure 3. The fall in investment causes the financial market to shrink
laThe eslasticity of substitution for the investment good is relatively low. Therefore it becomes signficantly
more expensive afber the depreciation of the local currency.
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and the banking ma,rkups to increase. Higher fina,ncial ma,rkups are reflected not only in
a direct increment in the real cost of borrowing for entrepreneurs, but also in lower asset
prices that deteriorate the position of balance sheets (a,nd indirectly increase borrowing
costs). Therefore, investment is significantly affected. The "broad" fina,ncial accelerator
propagates fina,ncial disturbances, amplifies the business cycle, and alters the evolution of
the capital stock throughout the ocperiment. As a result, real wages fall significantly, for
two reasons. Firstly, a less capital intensive technology a,ffects the marginal productivity
of labor. Secondly the recessive pattern of the cycle increase ex-post markups in the real
goods market and thus affects wages. Lower wages are associated with lower labor efiort
and output. Permanent income theory applies: The combined effect of lower wages and
work effort a,ffects household income and causes consumption to remain relatively lower. Tlo
ameliorate the negative impact these events have on domestic output, the central bank is
forced to be less aggressive when increasing the interest rates. Lower rates moderate the
fall in consumption a,nd deliver a more robust depreciation that improves the international
position of the econorny.
In Figure 5, I plot the response of key variables in a scenario in which the monetary
authority is committed to defend a fixed nominal exchange rate peg. In the baseliue scenario
with the bank-supply channel turned-off (dashed line), the domestic nominal interest rate
rises to match the increase in the foreign interest rate so that (3.8) holds. Due to nominal
price rigidities, there is also a significant increase in the real interest rate that in turns
induces a contraction in output. The fall in the dema^nd for domestic goods causes domestic
prices to fall, but in this case foreigu goods prices remain unaffected. The ecouomy enters a
deflationary spiral in which much higher real interest rates generate a sharp fall in household
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consumption and asset valuation. The dual presence of a negative debt-deflation impact
on the liability side on the one hand, and lower assets prices on the other hand, severely
damage the financial position of firms. Hence, immediately after the shock, the conventional
financial accelerator starts working by raising the leverage ratio and the external finance
premium, thereby magnifying the investment drop. Even if the nominal exchange rate
does not change in this e:rperiment, the economy improves its international position (with
higher er<ports a,nd greater import substitution) * u result of the local recession and the
deflationary spiral.
With monopolistic competition in the banking sector, the amplification mechanism is
even more robust (see the solid line). A shrinking financial market causes bank ma,rkups to
increase and asset prices to fall, contributing to a further deterioration of balance sheets.
The feedback mechanism behind the two channels of this "broad" fina,ncial accelerator
increases borrowing costs for entrepreneurs, arnplifying the response of investment and
other real variables.
For completeness, in Fig 6 and 7, I show the balance-sheet and the bank-supply channels
acting independently. In both figures, the dashed line refers to the SOE model without
fina,ncial frictions. In this baseline setup the real cost of borrowing for wholesalers is just
the real interest rate paid to depositors. We can observe, that the two channels work in
the same direction and contribute independently to the same phenomenon. However, the
internal propagation mechanism is more robust when they interact together in the complete
model. See Figure 8.
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3.4.3 Macroeconomic Variability
To assess the quantitative relevance of the model, in Table 2 I display theoretical second
moments (as percent deviations from steady state values) obtained though the frequency
domain technique depicted in Uhlig (1999) for the parametrization already described. To
get the estimates, I set the standard deviation of the productivity innovations at 0.007L2, in
line with the RBC literature, and the standard deviation of the foreign interest rate shock
equal to 0.0065, which is also well within the range used in the literature (see Batini et al
200L, and Nelson and Neiss, 2001). The empirical moments for the relevarrt variables are
taken from the series used in Aguiar and Gopinath (2004). Output is real GDP, investment
is gross fixed capital formation and household consumption is private consumption. These
series are deseasonalized. For comparison purposes, both empirical and theoretical series
are HP filtered with a smoothness parameter of 1600 so that only the cyclical component
remains.
Notice that I purposely selected countries that d,e facto kept their orchange rates fixed
during most of the span of the data available. Following Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), I
consider periods in which there is either a de facto peg or at least a de facto crawling band
that never exceeds the * l- 5% range. I proceed in this way for two reasons. Although some
countries efiectively allowed the exchange rate to float, it is difficult to determine whether
they actually committed to a Taylor Rule in the period under consideration. Besides, the
model assumes that liabilities are denominated in domestic currency, but in fact, most of
the emerging economies have at least a fraction of firms' liabilities denominated in foreign
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cumency.ls In principle, it could be the case that some of the accounted volatility simply
reflects firms'leverage ratios responding to changes in the exchange rate. In summary the
specification that assumes a floating exdrange rate may not be suitable for making historical
comparisons with the data available.
Sample averages of the empirical moments for the eight emerging economies depicted
in Table 1 are reported in the last column of Table 2. The standa,rd deviations for output,
consumption and investment ue 2.79,3.60 and 10.75 respectively. The first four columns
report four different theoretical scenarios: baseline SOE model, only monopolistic banking
sector added, only balance-sheet-effect added, and both interacting together. Neither the
standard credit channel nor the sole presence of a monopolistic ba,nking can capture the
historic investment volatility. In each case, the standard deviation for investment is 6.79
and 6.4L respectively. The fourth column displaying the results of the complete model with
the "broad" financial accelerator shows that the richer model is actuallv the best one at
replicating the actual volatility of real va^riables found in the data. In this case, the output
and investment standard deviations are 2.28 and 10.90, respectively.
3.4.4 Welfare Analysis
Now I consider how the welfare of the representative household is affected by the presence
of monopoly power in the banking system. The welfare criterion is based on a second-order
Taylor expansion of the representative household's expected utility function (3.1), around
the deterministic steadv-state:
15The model can be easily extended to consider the case of liabilities heavily denominated in foreign (hard)
currency. Depending on the calibration, the impact of a exchange rate depreciation under flexible exchange
rates maybe less or more da.rraging than the contraction in asset prices under fixed exchange rates.
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Variables with hats denote the percent deviation from the steady state, and variables
without time subscripts denote steady-state values. The welfare results for the main scenar-
ios previously discussed are listed in Table 3. In each case, I report the percent increase in
steady-state consumption that makes the household as well off as it would be in a baseline
scenario with flo<ible orctrange rates a,nd perfect competition in the banking system. The
results conflrm that the representative household is better off in the baseline scenario. In
principle, households would be willing to accept a monopolistic banking system if steady-
state consumption is 6.43% higher. If they are also forced to accept fixed exctrange rates, the
required increment is 7.20%. Monopolistic financial intermediaries a.ffect welfare through
two different cha,nnels. First, the bank markup generates a permanent disintermediation
between borrowers and entrepreneurs that results in lower steady-state levels of capital ac-
cumulation, output, and hence consurnption. Second, the countercyclical pattern of such
markups increases the volatility of real variables, amplifies the business cycle, and thus
reduces welfare. Finally the transmission mecha,nism implies a much larger propagation of
external shocks under a fixed exchange rate regime.
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3.5 Conclusions
The modeling of the banking system captures several features of the empirical evidence
observed in emerging economies. Entry occurs at the wholesale level a.nd spreads later
into a highly segmented retail market. If banking markets are underdeveloped, small, and
regulated, only lower-cost banks attempt to enter the market and compete. However, their
chances of a successfirl take over are higher tha,n in a highly developed ba^nking system.
Although changes in the market structure do not affect the ma,rkups, entry threats force
incumbents to set lower markups to deter the competitive pressure. Economies of scale
facilitate entry in boom periods, and vice versa, generating countercyclical markups.
At a general equilibrium level, I show that this behavior of the ba,nking system generates
a bank-supply channel that interacts with the evolution of the fi.rms' balance sheets to
reinforce the credit channel: Credit is more expensive during recessions, and firms and
households postpone investment and work decisions, leading to a deeper recession. Thus,
market power in the banking system increases the volatility of real variables, amplifies the
business cycle, and reduces welfare.
In the calibration of the model for a representative small open developing economy, I
showed that the inclusion of imperfect competition in the banking system helps to explain
the relatively large investment volatility typically experienced in these countries. These
conclusions are robust to different monetary regimes. First, I consider the case of a monetary
authority able to commit to a Taylor-type rule under floating rates. Then, I allow for the
possibility of a central bank in a position of having to defend a fixed e:rchange rate peg.
In either case, I show that the monetary authority is unable to avoid a sizable decrease in
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investment after a negative external shock. The results hold even if the speed with which
exchange rate adjustments feed through to the consumer price index is slow and liabilities
are fuIly denominated in local currency. In contrast, the sole presence of the standard
balance-sheet channel fails to deliver any internal propagation mechanism in this context.
There are several extensions of the analysis that can be pursued in future work. The
model may contribute to explaining the observed decline in real variables during financial
crisis episodes. It could be easily modified to study the impact of currency depreciation
when liabilities are heavily denominated in foreign cuffency. Additionally, the model may
also be extended to capture the consequences of long-term relationships between banks and
their customers. Regional ba^nks in developing economies are usually engaged in long-term
relationships with small domestic entrepreneurs who otherwise would have no access to the
credit markets. Therefore, entry threats, which force low profit margins, can increase the
degree of financial fragility and disrupt these relationships.
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Appendix A: The Monopolistic Bank Contract.
In this appendix, I add monopoly power to the partial equilibrium contracting problem
in the non-stochastic steady-state developed in Bernanke et al (2000).
Let profits per unit of capital equal wRk, where a,,e[O, m) is an idiosyncractic shock with
E(w) : 1. I assume F(x) : Pr[ar < r] is a continuous probability distribution with F(0) : g.
I denote /(t.,) the pdf of cu. Let variables without time subscripts denote steady-state values.
The entrepreneur borrows QK 
- 
N to invest I( units of capital in a project. The total return
on capital is thus uRkQK . I assume that cu is unknown to both the entrepreneur and the
lender prior to the investment decision. After the investment decision is made, the lender
can only observe o by paying monitoring costs pwRkQK, where 0 < p < L. The "required"
return on lending for the bank equals the cost of firnds (deposit rate), ft, times the steady-
state gross bank markup, i.e. (1+ E)n.
The optimal bank contract specifies a cutoff value D such that if a,, Z t.r, the borrower
pays the lender the fixed amount IRJ"QK, and keeps the equity (w-a)RkQK.If. u ( c..r, the
borrower receives nothing, while the bank monitors the borrower and receives (1- fiwRkQK
in residual claims net of monitoring costs. In equilibrium, the bank earns an expected return
equal to the "required" return (1 + E).R, implying:
nrQx 
- 
(1 + E)R(QK 
-.^'r). (3.46)
The optimal contract manimizes the payoff to the entrepreneur subject to the bank
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(lr' wf (w)dw *, I: wf @)dt', - , Io" uf (w)0,)
earning the ttrequired" rate of return:
subject to equation (3.46).
Given constant returns to scale, the cutoff D determines
profits RbQK between the bank and lender. The expected,
the bank, f (t,,'), is:
f u /Poof(r) : | ,f(r)du+al wf(w)du.JO JA
Similarly, I define the expected monitoring costs , p,G(a) as:
pc(a) : tL [' ,f (r)d/").
JO
?T(1 - r(r))RkQK
Rrex (s.47)
the division of expected gross
gross share of profits going to
(3.48)
(3.50)
TT(I: ,f(r)*)
(3.4e)
The net share of profits going to the bank is f(A) 
- 
pG(A), and the share going to the
entrepreneur is l. 
- 
f(a). By definition, f(d) satisfies 0 < f(r,r) < 1.
The optimal contracting problem with non-stochastic monitoring may now be written
as:
subject to:
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[f(e) - pc(u-)] RbQK 
- 
(1 + 
=)R(QK - I'r).
k(a1 --f%,
(3.51)
Let s : #)U, denote the risk premium on external funds and tt : ff: ff, the
steady-state ratio of capital to net worth. Defining a as the Lagrange multiplier on the
constraint that the banks earn their "required" rate ofreturn in e:rpectation, the first order
conditions for an interior solution to the contracting problem imply that:
(3.52)
(3.53)
and
Where
Equations (3.52)
tures per unit of net
of equation (3.14).
{o) = f'(e)f'(a) 
- 
p,Q(a) '
T(D)-1-r(D) +r,(a) [r(D) -p,G(E)] .
and (3.53) provide an implicit relationship between
worth k(O) and the risk premium on external funds
(3.54)
(3.55)
capital expendi-
that is the basis
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k(a) 
- 
K(s(a)) 
"'(r) > 0. (3.56)
Notice, finally, that the set up of this contracting problem allows us to express V1 in
equation (3.16) as:
(3.57)
The first term in the right hand side, $Qr-tKr-1, is the average return on capital and
the expression in brackets is the aggregate ex-post costs of borrowing for the entrepreneurs.
That is, n11+=)ff is the net payment banks receive and, p [i w*Qt-tKt-1f (w)&,t are
aggregate default costs paid by the entrepreneurs. The default costs are captured by the
external finance risk premium. (3.57) may be used in order to express (3.17) in log-linea,r
form as:
aR+Qt-tKt-tf (w)d"l
^L - 
C(1 + E) #rW - nr)+ C(1 + a)(nt + nr-1) + C= (t\
u-4er-rKt-r 
- [",(1 +Er) #r*rt Io'
Where hats denote percent deviations from the steady-state and {fl' : (Ld{FqI FfU-
h*t 
- 
Pw,t) a collection of terms of second. order importance.
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Appendix B: Local Currency Pricing and Incomplete Pass-
through.
The speed by which exchange rate adjustments feed through to the consumer price
index in emerging markets has received widespread attention in the last few years.16 The
aim of this section is both to highlight the importa,nce of this issue in the construction of
monetary policy rules and to proceed with a sensitivity a^nalysis. In the baseline model,
I assumed complete pass-through; here I allow for the possibility that there is some delay
between movements in the orchange rate and the adjustment of imported good prices. To
introduce price inertia, I consider the case in which monopolistic competition also occurs
among foreign goods retailers that face the same degree of price rigidity as domestic goods
retailers.
In this case, the law of one price holds only at the wholesale level. Let Pfi,, be the
wholesale price of foreign goods in the domestic currency. The law of one price then implies
P#.t: 
^91P1. Instead, the optimal price set by retailers that are able to change prices at f,
Pfi, iS:
oo(
Dern, { n,,*k:0 \
-€
Y!r*r,e)lr*- (*'#,')l )({n) -0. (3.5e)
Therefore, the foreign price index evolves according to:
tuS"" for instance, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Devereaux and Lane (2003).
(3.60)
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which replaces (3.31) in the baseline setup. As a sensitivity analysis, I analyze the
tra"nsmission mechanism of this alternative setup. As before, I consider an unanticipated
one hundred basis point increase in the foreign nominal interest rate.
In the baseline case with full-pass-through, the Taylor rule specification dictates that
the central bank must always prevent a large exchange rate depreciation in order to control
CPI inflation. See Figure 3 again. Although the nominal interest rate is not tied to the
foreign interest rate (as in the case offixed exchange rates), a large depreciation is prevented
through a moderate increment in the nominal interest rate. The policy prescription in this
scenario resembles the case of a "dirty" float exchange rate regime.
Results differ in the case of incomplete-pass-through. See Figure 4. Here, the mone-
tary authority is able to decrease nominal interest rates while permitting a la,rge currency
depreciation. However, CPI inflation reacts very sluggishly because of the price rigidities
arnong foreign goods retailers. The lower real interest rates, together with a large exchange
rate depreciation, improves both the country's ability to absorb the negative shock and its
international position. Therefore, the decrease in output is even more moderate and very
short lasting.
Nonetheless, even in this scenario, which resembles a "purett floating exdrange rate
regime, the decline in investment is sizeable in the presence of imperfect competition in the
banking system.
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Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 1.
Define the break-even level of markups fu and 0i for the incumbent and the entrant.
The break-even level is equal to the value of the net markup that provides them zero profits
when serving the niche. That is:
7f I,t 
- 
01
-ul - 0, and 7f j,t - 0i
Now, let's analyze the case in which uj ) ut, and thus 0i > 0r Consider for example,
El*, > Ei*, t 0i. Thebank , has no demand and its profits are zero. But, if bank I cha"rges
El+r : Et*r- e (where e is positive but nil), it gets the entire niche and has a positive
profitEf*, 
-e-07)0.
Therefore bank j cannot be acting in its own interest by charging Ef*r. No* suppose
Elt+t: Ei*, > 0i.Inthat case they share the niche, and each one serves half of it. But if
bank j red.uces its price slightly to Ei*, 
- 
e, it gets all the niche. Nonetheless, bank j will
never charge Ei*, < dj', because it would make a negative profit. It follows that bank J can
charge El+r : 0i 
- 
u and guarantee for itself all the niche while obtaining a positive profit
0i-r-01)0.
Therefore bank j is indifferent between staying or leaving the niche, since will not be
able to serve it. If bank I ofiers bank j a negligible but positive amount of output e so as
to merge, it is in the best interest of bank j to accept it. A symmetric analysis holds when
ui 1rs1.l
(#)/ Dt+t \ t-r(Tl\n /(#) -uj(+) '-"-o
(A.1)
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Addendum
Tables and Graphs
CIIAPTER 1
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Descriptive Statistics 
-Mean (M) and Standard Deviation (SD)-
Table L: Time Series Properties.
Dependent Variable: Net Interest Margins(NlM)
OLS
LEVEI,S
WITHIN
GROUPS
GMM
DIF
lSTEP
GMM
DIF
2STEPS
GMM
SYS
lSTEP
GMM
SYS
2STEPS
NIM,_l 0.835
f0.000)
o.423
(0.000)
o.296
(0.021)
.292
(0.020)
.728
(0.ooof
.759
(0.000)
m1
m2
Sarean
-2.24
(0.02s)
-0.675
(0.s00)
.r78
-3.34
(0.001)
o.4228
(o.6721
.L23
Smple: 124 Countries (1991-2000).
-Ver O"mles;cUaea in aU mAas.
-m1 and m2 are test for fint and second ords ssial couelation for fust-diffsenced residuals, cymptotically N (0, 1), They ue reported
ftom the Ent-step estimations.
-The Srgm Test for over-identi$ing restrictions for the GMM estimators is mlmptotically tz. It is reported ftom the two-step
estimations.
-P- values are reported in parentheses.
NET
INTEREST
MARGINS
PRIVATE
CREDIT
CONCENTRATION No. of
Foreign
Banks
Obs.
Developing
countries
M O.O571
sD o.o351
t{r o.2sg2
sD o.2L25,
M 0.6645
sD 0.2280/
lil 0.3,226
sD o.1839
91
Developed
countries
M 0.0268
sD o.o119
M 0.7653
sD 0.3331
M 0.5751
sD 0.220,6
Nl 0.2769
sD o.2L44
33
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Table 2: Basic Model
Dependent Variable: Net Interest Margins (N/M, )
GMM
DIF
2STEPS
GMM
SYS
lSTEP
GMM
SYS
2STEPS
GMM
DIF
2STEPS
GMM
SYS
lSTEP
GMM
SYS
2STEPS
GMM
DIF
2STEPS
GMM
SYS
lSTEP
GMM
SYS
2STEPS
GMM
SYS I OBV
NIMt*l o.o 13
(o.e27l
.678
(0.000)
.720
(0.000)
0.040
(0.804)
o.574
(0.000)
.573
(0.000)
o.o7L
(0.5e8)
0.540
(0.000)
0.543
(0.000)
0.556
(o.oo0)
GROWTH, -0.159
(0.005)
-0.108
(0.00e)
-0.095
(0.014)
-0.130
(0.02e)
-o.o74
(0.0e0)
-o.o77
(0.088)
-0.095
(0.0ss)
-0.083
(o.a27l
-0.081
(o.o3o)
-0.071
(0.o36)
PNV.CRED.(avs),
-0.033
(0.316)
-0.031
(0.000)
-0.030
(0.000)
-0.033
(0.32s)
-0.034
(o.oo0)
-0.033
(0.000)
-0.032
(0.000)
CONCENTRATION,
-0.015
(o.5471
-0.019
(0.066)
-0.017
(0.084)
-0.018
(0.062)
.m1
.m2
Sargan
-2.795
(0.00s)
- 1.591
(0.1 12)
0.117
-3.19
(0.001)
o.2L98
(0.826)
0.103
-2.543
(0.011)
-1.553
(0. 121)
0.141
-3.04
(0.002)
0.515
(0.607)
o.27 r
-2.600
(0.00e)
-r.387
(0.166)
0.251
-3.LL7
(0.002)
o.496
(0.620)
0.885 0.860
Sample: 109 Countries (1991-2000). For further information, see notes to Table 1.
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Table 3: The Role of Inflation. Real Rates. and Operatine Costs.
Dependent Variable: Net Interest Margins (NIM,)
GMM
SYS
lSTEP
GMM
SYS
2STEPS
GMM
SYS
I pBv
GMM
SYS
lSTEP
GMM
SYS
2STEPS
GMM
SYS
I pBv
I{IM,_l 0.388(o.0oo)
0.394
(0.000)
0.393
(0.000)
0.378
(0.000)
o.394
(0.000)
o.462
(0.000)
GROWTH,
-0.078
(o.o42l
-o,a77
(0.0s1)
-o.o92
(0.012)
-0.094
(0.020)
-o.o92
(0.034)
-0.095
(0.046)
PfuII/.CRED.(aug), -o.o22(0.001)
-0.021
(0.o01)
-o.o23
(0.000)
-0.050
(o.oo1)
-0.048
(0.002)
-0.040
(0.000)
CONCENTRATION,
-0.0o9
(0.286)
-o.o 10
(0.265)
-o.010
(a.22ol
-0.021
(0.136)
-o.o24
(o.oe3)
-0.013
(0.21s)
OVERCOSTS I
0.460
(0.0001
o.454
(0.000)
0.438
(0.000)
INFLATIOI{, -0.015(o.2571 -0.016(0.205) -0.012(0.310)
KEALPJ,TE,
0.0003
(0.312)
0.0003
(0.312)
0.0002
(0.4s4)
.ml
.m2
Sargan
-2.934
(0.0o3)
0.6728
(0.s01)
o.725 o.784
-2.452
(0.014)
1.137
(0.2s6)
0.975 o.977
Sample: 109 Countries. 1991-2000. For frrrther information, see notes to Table 1.
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Table 4: Entry and the counter-cyclicalitv of the net interest mareins.
Dependent Variable: Net Interest Margins (NIM,)
GMM
SYS
2STEPS
GMM
SYS
J. oBv
GMM
SYS
lSTEP
GMM
SYS
2STEPS
GMM
SYS
I nBv
GMM
SYS
2STEPS
GMM
SYS
I oBv
GMM
SYS
lSTEP
GMM
SYS
2STEPS
GMM
SYS
I oBv
NIM,_l o.479
(0.001)
o.499
(0.000)
0.510
(0.000)
0.503
(0.000)
0.505
(0.000)
0.348
(0.001)
0.389
(0.oos)
o.342
(0.020)
0.351
(0.000)
0.390
(0.00s)
GROWTH, -o.o29(0.186)
-o.o24
(0.38e)
-o.026
(0.343)
-0.029
(0.302)
-0.032
(0.213)
0.023
(0.6es)
-0.021
(0.683)
0.013
(0.82s)
-0.010
(0.86e)
-0.030
(0.s86)
PRIV .CRED.(avs), -0.033
(o.000)
-0.032
(o.oo0)
-o.o28
(o.oo1)
-o.o29
(o.oo1)
-0.028
{o.oo1)
-0.012
(o.1so)
-0.015
f0.26s)
-0.013
(o.o6e)
-0.011
fo.115)
-0.014
f0.033)
coNCENTR., -0.007
rc.6211
-0.003
rc.2481
-0.003
(0.833)
-0.003
rc.7991
-0.004
rc,7631
-0.016
(0.251)
-0.014
(0.265)
-0.015
(0.31 1)
-o.oL2
(0.398)
-o.oL2
(0.383)
INFLATION, o.o22
(o.275]'
0.016
(0.436)
-o.o22
(0.233)
-o.o24
(0.231)
-o.026
(0.268)
REALMTE, 0.0002
(0.3601
0.0002
(0.312)
0.0002
(o.260)
0.0002
(0.238)
0.0002
p.2481
OI/ERCOSTS, 0.520(o.ooe)
0.458
(0.00e)
0.516
(0.00s)
0.520
(o.o06)
o.467
(o.006)
Foreign Banks,_, -0.033(0.188)
-0.031
(o.2L4l
-0.036
(0.067)
-0.040
(0.1se)
Foreign Banks,_, 0.025(0.032)
o.026
(0.037)
o.o27
(0.0ee)
0.031
(0.084)
LForeign Banks,_, -0.031(0.046)
-0.032
(0.068)
-0.033
(0.063)
-0.033
(0.0e3)
-0.031
(0.1 15)
-0.033
(0.0e4)
.m1
.m2
Sargan
-2.ro7
(0.03s)
1.537
(o.r24l
1.000 o.784
-2.452
(0.014)
t.r37
(0.2s6)
1.000 1.000
-2.792
(0.00s)
2.OL7
(0.044)
o.464 0.507
-2.80r
(0.00s)
2.O28
(0.043)
0.375 r.000
Sample: 95 Countries (1991-2000. For further information, see Table 1.
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Table 5 - Reeional Analvsis
Dependent Variable: Net Interest Margins (NIM,)
GMM
SYS
lSTEP
GMM
SYS
2STEPS
GMM
SYS
lSTEP
GMM
SYS
2STEPS
GMM
SYS
I oBv
GMM
SYS
lSTEP
GMM
SYS
2STEPS
GMM
SYS
I nov
NIMH* POOR .664(0.000)
.678
(0.000)
0.566
(0.ooo)
o.576
(0.000)
0.590
(0.000)
0.584
(0.000)
0.630
(0.000)
0.588
(0.000)
NIMFT* (1 
- 
POOR) 0.403(0.001)
o.44L
(0.002)
0.504
(0.000)
o.547
(0.000)
0.540
(0.000)
o.562
(0.000)
0.613
(0.000)
0.568
(0.000)
GROWH,* POOR
-0.113
(0.013)
-0.1 1 1
(0.030)
-o.064
t0.082)
-0.066
(0.101)
-0.052
(0.1091
-0.075
(0.0s6f
-o.o74
(0.103)
-0.080
(0.037)
GROWH,*(I- POOR) -0.078(0.081) -o.o76(o.1os) -0.055(0.115) -0.015(0.708) -0.059(o.oee) -o.067(0.0e2)
-0.019
(o.674)
-o.o72
(0.383)
PRII/.CRED(avil* POOR -0.032(0.067)
-o.o29
(0.081)
-0.028
(o.os1)
-0.033
(0.021)
-o.o22
(0.036)
-0.030
(0.006)
PRII/ .CRED(ars)* (l 
- 
POOR) -0.025(o.oo4)
-o.o27
(o.011)
-0.023
(o.0o3)
-0.025
(0.ooe)
-0.025
(o.oo7)
-0.025
(0.006)
CONCENTR.* POOR
-0.043
(0.608)
-0.o53
(0.469)
-0.058
(0.456)
OoNCENTR.* (1 _ POOR) -o.o 1 1(0.2s9)
-0.063
(0.541)
-a.oL2
rc.2341
.m1
.m2
Sarsan
-3.18
(0.001)
o.2084
(0.83s)
o.773
-3.041
(0.002)
0.5090
(0.61 1)
1.000 1.000
-3.195
(0.001)
0.5798
(o.s62)
1.000 1.000
Sample: 115 Countries (1991-2000). For further information, see Table 1.
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Table 6: Entrv and the countercyclical margins (Regional Analvsis)
Dependent Variable: Net Interest Margins (NIM,)
GMM
SYS
lSTEP
GMM
SYS
2STEPS
GMM
SYS I DEV
NIMt_l 0.253
(o.087)
o.274
(0.078)
0.38s
(0.00s)
GROWTH, -o.oL2
(0.673)
-0.028
(0.368)
-0.006
(0.800)
PRIV .CRED.(avg), -0.039(0.001)
-o.o37
(0.002)
-0.033
(0.000)
CONCENTR,, -0.0009
(0.es u
o.o24
(0.2s 1)
-0.001
(0.e 13)
LForeign Banks,-r* POOR -o.o44(0.o23)
-0.041
(0.067)
-0.033
(0.073)
LForeign Banks,-, * (l 
- 
POOR) 0.020(0.102)
0.018
(0.0ee)
o.o32
(0.006)
.m1
,m2
Sargan
-2.369
(0.018)
L.667
(0.096) o.992 0.984
I l8
Table 7: Determinants of entrv in the local financial svstem (Sample: 67 Develooine Countries -1991-2000)
Dependent Variable: 61t6y"ign 3on1u,
GMM
SYS
lSTEP
GMM
SYS
2STEPS
GMM
svs I opv
GMM
SYS
lSTEP
GMM
SYS
2STEPS
GMM
svs I osv
GROWTH,
0.870
(0.026)
1.05
(0.036)
o.837
(0.014)
0.s99
(0.0e7)
0.528
(0.088)
0.s9s
(0.081)
GROWTH,_t
o.o27
(0.0s7)
0.030
(0.137)
0.014
(0.s20)
0.017
(0.201)
0.018
(0.134)
o.ol2
(0.36e)
RULE of LllW -0.001(0.8181 -0.0005(0.933) -0.0004(0.9541 0.013(0.136) 0.01 1(0.1s0| o.or2(0.190)
N,.of REI/OLUTIONS -0.012(0.63s)
-0.o07
(0.7e8)
-0.011
(0.60s)
-0.054
(0.104)
-0.048
(0.876)
-0.051
(0. 131)
FREEDOM -0.o12(o.42el
-0.013
(0.480)
-0.008
(0.678)
-0.023
(o.2321
-o.o22
(0.17e)
-o.o24
(a.%41
PRIT/.CRED.(avg), -0.014(o.7341
-0.059
(0.876)
-0.002
(o.ees)
CONCENTR,,
-o.o12
(0.084)
-0.010
(0.1s0)
-0.o11
(0.137)
GDP,
o.o44
(0.038)
0.039
(0.061)
0.040
(0.06e)
.m1
.m2
Sargan
-2.369
(0.0 r8)
L.667
(0.0e6)
0.817 o.912
-3.096
(0.002)
0.8451
(0.3e8)
1.000 1.000
Variable Definitions
,l\lM: Net interest income minus interest over total assets (after subtracting defaulted loans).
GROW'IHI Annual growth rate of real GDP.
PRII/. CRE,DJfI.: Private Credit by deposit money banks to GDP, calculated using the following
deflation method: (o.S) *14 t r", + 4_, t q,,]tlCo4, t a,l
COI.EI,:IRAfIOJ{! Assets of t}re three largest banks as a share of the assets of all the
commercial banks in the system.
OVERCOSTS: Accounting value of a bank's overhead costs as a share of its total assets.
INFLAIIOI'E Annual inllation from the GDP deflator.
RE/ALRATB. Real interest rate.
Foretgn8anfts Number of foreign banks to total number of banks. A bank is defined to be a
foreign bank if it has at least fifty percent foreign ownership.
L, Forelgn BwrJcs, Variation in the number of foreign banks.
GIIP: Real GDP per capita.
No. of Retnlutlons Average number of revolutions (1970-2OOO).
FREt,OOffi, Freedom House Ratings.
Rulc of Law: ICRG taw and Order Rating.
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VARIABLE RBC ICFM
Output 1.90 2.3L
Consumption o.52 o.70
Investment 5.74 12.o8
Capital o.49 o.94
Employment L.37 2.19
CIIAPTER 2
Table 1: Standard Deviation
Notes: Theoretical second moments (as percentage deviations from steady-state values) are reported. RBL
refers to the standard RBC model and ICFM to the monopolistic financial market setup. The method used was
the frequency domain tectrnique described in Uhlig (1999). The series are H-P liltered with a smoothness
parameter of 1600 so that only the cyclical components remain.
Table 2: Relative Standard Deviation
Notes: Standard deviations relative to outDut. For further information. see notes to Table 8.
Table 3 : SensitivitvAnalvsis
Notes: Volatilities for different parameter values of ? . For further information, see notes to Table 8.
VARIABLE RBC ICFM
Output 1.00 1.00
Consumption o.29 0.30
Investment 3.19 5.23
Capital o.28 o.4r
Emplo\nnent o.76 0.95
VARIABLE r 
- 
0.20 r 
- 
0.40 r 
- 
0.60 r = 0.80
Output r.84 2.O2 2.2L 2.4L
Consumption 0.60 o.62 o.66 o.74
Investment 8.24 9.67 TT.26 12.89
Capital 0.68 0.78 0.89 0.98
Employment 1.43 L.7 t 2.O3 2.35
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CTIAPTER 3
Table L: Net Interest Mareins Statistics.
DEVELOPED ECONOMIES EMERGING ECONOMIES
COUNTRY MEAN sT DEV(I) STDEV(2) COUNTRY MEAN sTDEV(1) ST DEV(2)
United Kingdom 0.020 0.003 15.8 Argentina 0.070 0.031 44.2
Lurembourg 0.008 0.002 25.0 Israel 0.030 0.005 15.9
Ireland 0.013 0.003 18.8 South Korea 0.022 0.003 14.9
Japan 0.019 0.003 15.8 Malaysia 0.028 0.004 13.8
Switzedand 0.017 0.003 15.8 Mexico 0.054 0.010 19.0
Germany 0.026 0.004 74.r Philippines 0.040 0.008 20.3
USA 0.040 0.003 6.2 Slovak R.p 0.031 0.009 28.6
Thailand 0.025 0.008 32.3
Sample Average 0.020 ------- 15.9 Sample Average 0.038 23.6
Notes: The variable in consideration is Net Interest Margins (Bank Markups) for the period 1991-2000. Sample Mean,
Standard Deviation (1), and Sandard Deviation as a percentage deviation ftom individual mean values (2) are reported-
Source: Daabase on Bank Structure, Wodd Bank Research Departrnent (1999 and,2003 editions).
Table 2: Standard Deviation
Notes: Observed and Theoretical second moments (as percent deviation ftom steady sate values) ate rqrorted.
-Iheqrclical[4als@$: SOE is the baseline 5mell 6pgr1 economy model with nominal rigidities. BS adds the standard
balence-sheet-effect to the previous specification; instead, MBS adds the Monopolistic Banking System setup. Finally,
BS+MBS adds the "broad" frnarcitaf acceletator (ie. the combined effect of both). The method usedwas the ftequency
domain technique depicted in Uhlig 0999).
-Esspt&ilAgasgt!: Obsewed Statistics for the selected sample of eight developing economies are based in seasonally
adfusted quarterly data. Following Reinhart and Rogoff (2002),1llthe computations, I consider pedods in which there is
either a de facto peg or at least a de facto cravling band that never exceeds + / - 5 o/o xange. Variables, excqrt interest rates
are transformed in logarithms.
-For comparison purposes, both Empirical and Theoretical series are H-P filtered with a smoothness parameter of 1600 so
that only the cydica.l compooent refirains.
Table 3: Welfare Analvsis
BAIANCE SHEETS
ONLY
BALANCE SHEETS +
MONOPOLISTIC BANKING
FLEXIBLE EXCFIANGE
RATES
6.430
FIXED EXCFIANGE
RATES
0.540 7.200
Notes: The welfare criteda considered here is based on a second-order Taylor expansion of the r4xesentative household's
expected utility function (provided the parzmeterization specified in the paper). I report the percent increase in steady-state
consurnDtion that makes the household as well off than it would be in the baseline scenado.
VARTABLE SOE MBS BS BS+MBS DATA
Output 1.50 1.89 1.83 2.28 2.79
Consumption 2.45 2.68 2.56 2.67 3.60
Investment 3.87 6.4r 6.79 10.90 10.75
Bank Markup (I.tr.t
Interest Marein)
1,7.69 23.03 23.09
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FIGURE 2 - FI,EXIBI,E EXCHANGE RATEAND PERFECT COMPETITION IN THE BANKING
SYSTEftI
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